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THE SECOND RUSSIAN REVOLUTION?

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CURRENT HISTORY

FOUNDED IN 1914

OCTOBER 1992

VOL. 91, NO. 567

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EDITOR'S NOTE:

In 1917, *Current History* published its first articles on the unfolding of the Russian Revolution. In the 74 years that followed—through the end of World War I, the allied intervention in the Russian civil war, the reign of Stalin, and the cold war—the magazine provided continuous coverage of the country to which that revolution gave birth. This year we examine what has taken its place.

What now occupies the post-Soviet space? Vibrant democracies eagerly implementing free market reforms and cultivating friendly relations across newly internationalized borders? The answer of course is no; what is left is a region in transition, where much of the old guard (in the guise of democrats) still dictates the course of change, while genuine reformers find their efforts stifled by those intent on protecting their power and prestige. Casting a shadow over the entire enterprise are increasingly violent outbursts of ethnic hatred and militant nationalism.

The fluidity of the region's political and economic life prompted the question mark in this issue's title. It indicates a skepticism that also informs the articles that follow—from Elena Bonner's muted optimism about the course of change in the Commonwealth to Marshall Goldman's incisive analysis of Russia's economic reform program. Other articles look at the issues that will define the post-Soviet states, and we end with an autopsy of the Soviet Union and communism by Adam Ulam. One hopes next year's topics do not include the corpse of Russian democracy.

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"Revolutions are made quickly. But the process of creation is long and tedious; it takes many years of hard work. We must create our country and ourselves. As a Radio Liberty listener wrote: 'We destroyed our prison, but for some reason we expect the jailers to keep bringing swill to our cells.' That is an accurate description of our situation today."

Looking to the Future

BY ELENA BONNER

Predicting the future is a thankless task. But in Russia everyone who reads the newspapers and kills evenings by watching television news intently (the Russian *Vesti* at eight and eleven, and *Novosti* at nine and midnight) has become an amateur futurologist. Not out of a natural curiosity—as in the song, "I want to know what awaits me and I wa-a-ant to be ha-a-ppy." And not because in our life, where we are denied almost all positive emotions, it feels good to be able to say, "I told you so." I catch myself reminiscing. When, on General Secretary Yuri Andropov's death, I was asked by two American diplomats who his successor would be, I said Konstantin Chernenko. I was so happy my prognosis was correct. Why? Petty vanity.

And futurology is for everyone! Indulgence in this failing is the result of fear—fear of a sudden and sharp change in one-sixth of the globe, and of a change in personal environment. In the past, if you had saved 10,000 rubles you considered yourself a substantial person; today you do not know if that amount will last a month. You do not know what you will be able to buy tomorrow for dinner (whatever is being offered to the line you will undoubtedly be in). If you are used to taking a vacation by the sea (Baltic or Black, it does not matter), you do not know how much bread (let us not even think about meat) costs there and whether your

rubles will be accepted. And the old map (new ones have not been printed for lack of paper) will not tell you where in your own country, or now in a neighboring country, you can find a vacation spot. You do not know even whether you will have a vacation, because you do not know how long you will have a job. And when no one knows such simple short-term things about himself or herself, then the politicization of the people is manifested not only in rallies but also in futurology epidemics. Like many others I am infected, and these notes can be regarded as clinical symptoms of the disease.

Futurology's Sovietological branch has reconfirmed the nineteenth-century poet Fedor Tutchet's line, "Russia cannot be understood by the mind." They used to say: Communism can be crushed only by a third world war. They used to say: no forcible changes in a country's borders (codified in the Helsinki Act of 1975), but the politicians seemed to remember no changes at all. And so the West bought the hope of peace in Europe for a few concessions on human rights. The fate of 300 million people in the Soviet Union (and as many more in the satellite countries) remained outside the frame. They used to say: the disintegration of the Soviet Union will lead to civil war. They used to say: the nuclear button must be in one person's hands. For many years the world lived in fear of a third world war, or a nuclear one, or a civil one. Paradoxically, we cannot rule out the possibility that these three terrible prophecies did not come true because of the very existence of nuclear weapons.

The collapse of communism and the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the Soviet bloc are indubitably positive phenomena. Perestroika and its predecessor, acceleration, never had these as a strategic goal. But everything else is still unclear.

ELENA BONNER, a writer and human rights activist, is a former member of the Communist party who was sentenced in 1984 to five years in internal exile for her dissident activities (she was released, along with her husband, Andrei Sakharov, in 1986). She is the author of the memoir *Alone Together* (New York: Knopf, 1986). This article was translated from the Russian by Antonina W. Bouis.

HOW NOT TO SUCCEED AT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC UNION

The creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States revealed the mentality of the leaders of the new post-Soviet countries—their profound “union” approach, their inability, despite their avowed total sovereignty, to sail solo. The rapidity of the CIS’s birth after the Soviet collapse probably has no analogue in world history. Without setting common legal norms, without dividing up property, debts, and embassies, and by proclaiming a single army without an underlying military doctrine, the CIS doomed itself.

Why was it created? It is not a defense alliance like NATO or the Warsaw Pact (may it rest in peace); CIS members, it seems, must defend themselves from one another, not from some mythical enemy. It is not an economic union, in which there must be some measure of striving to help each other. And it is not a political union—states without constitutions and with parliaments elected before the state was born cannot seriously unite for political aims. And there are ethnic wars being waged in two of the states—Azerbaijan and Moldova—in which at least two other former republics are involved. (There is also an ethnic war in Georgia, but Georgia is not part of the CIS.)

Meetings of its leaders since its inception have merely confirmed the absence of an idea in the creation of the CIS. But their declaration of a commonwealth, taken at face value, led to many mistakes by the leaders of the new countries and by Western politicians (just as when they perceived the Soviet Union, which in fact did not exist, as a real state). In the last six months the members of the CIS have managed not to do anything in common—neither a unified economic space, a common ruble zone, a military defense space, or a division of debts and property. Nor have they created anything of their own! For example: formally, the CIS consists of eleven states, but only six have signed the defense agreement. Does that mean it is not mandatory, and that at any time those bound by the agreement could become five, four, or three? Every country goes off on its own, each seeking new friends (rich ones, preferably) who can help and who are strong. Each jealously follows which neighbors are getting more aid. And they fear them. The situation resembles that in a communal apartment, where no one trusts anyone and everyone is engaged in hidden or overt warfare. Before the Soviet Union fell apart, the economist Vasily Selyunin wrote that each republic would go its own way: “We’ll save ourselves singly.” And so it’s every man for himself.

THE NONCOMMONWEALTH STATES GO IT ALONE

The Baltic republics of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia have removed themselves from the common pot for good, it seems. If they find ways to resolve the question

of citizenship without violating human rights, their entry into Europe will be faster and easier than that of the other new countries (especially since they are actively privatizing land and do not exhibit any fear of foreign capital). But there is an army of between 130,000 and 140,000 former Soviet soldiers on their territory and no one knows to whom they belong, Russia or the CIS. This is destabilizing, and the Baltics need Western help in solving the problem.

Georgia did not join the Commonwealth under President Zviad Gamsakhurdia and is not joining under the rule of the State Council. But CIS military units, which had been removed from the conflict in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan, ended up in Georgia just as Eduard Shevardnadze (the former minister of internal affairs of Georgia, the former first secretary of the Georgian Communist party, and the former minister of foreign affairs of the Soviet Union) returned. Is this a mere coincidence, or was the army “protecting” his resumption of power? The process is not yet complete. Elections are supposed to be held in the fall. Apparently Shevardnadze will be elected; he has made good use of ties established in former posts, his international reputation, and the think tank that was created for him and is now headed by the last Soviet foreign minister, Aleksandr Bessmertnykh.

On Georgia’s Independence Day, United States Secretary of State James Baker 3d personally came to Tbilisi with a cargo of humanitarian aid. The West is readily helping Georgia, not noticing that there is a war going on in the country. Shevardnadze once said that you had to be a real democrat in order to resolve ethnic problems; now his democratic values are being tested. His recent visit to Tskhinvali, the capital of South Ossetia, the region of Georgia that is fighting to unite with North Ossetia across the border in Russia, did not bring peace.

Shevardnadze was accompanied by Aleksandr Dzasokhov, a former Politburo member. This was perceived in Ossetia as an attempt to solve the problem in the easiest way—by putting your own man in there. But sending crack army units made up of veterans of the war in Afghanistan and moving Russian troops stationed in the Georgian city of Kutaisi into Ossetia is dangerous and will lead to a Yugoslav-like crisis. Peace can be achieved only through compromise by both sides, the creation of a zone of international control, and demilitarization—not by attempts to return Ossetia to its former status. Georgia will no doubt remain outside the CIS; it has nothing to gain by joining, because it has its own natural resources, and sea and land borders that give free access to the West. Moreover, Shevardnadze needs to maintain his standing inside Georgia as a national leader with no ties to Moscow.

ETHNIC TENSIONS SPLIT THE COMMONWEALTH

The Commonwealth states have not been immune to ethnic tensions similar to those found in Georgia. Moldova's relationship with the CIS (particularly with Russia) is complicated by problems in the Trans-Dniester region. The sources of the conflict go back to the regime of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, when Moscow, attempting to keep Moldova from declaring independence, provoked strikes in the region. (A similar tactic was used in the Baltics.) Russians living in Trans-Dniester demanded sovereignty or a high degree of autonomy, with guarantees that if Moldova and Romania reunited—they have long-standing ties—they would have the right to secede.

It is hard to judge the likelihood of reunification, or when reunification might occur if it takes place at all. But the conflict in Trans-Dniester has moved from the political to the military, aided by the appearance in the region of Russian Cossacks who say they are defending resident Russians and the speeches of Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi and numerous deputies of the Russian parliament, as well as the presence of Russia's Fourteenth Army (Russian President Boris Yeltsin's decree ordering the removal of the army from the region has not been fulfilled).

The population of Trans-Dniester is mixed—23 percent Russian and the rest almost equally divided between Moldovans and Ukrainians. Ukraine's plan is to wait and watch. In Moldova itself, the party supporting reunification with Romania is strong. The question of federalizing the republic, recently raised in the Moldovan parliament, has not been decided, but this holds out the possibility of peace.

Azerbaijan joined the CIS along with the other republics in December 1991. But after the fall of President Ayaz Mutalibov the leaders of the Popular Front, who took control of the government, announced that Azerbaijan would not join the CIS. The new president, Abulfaz Elchibey, has not disavowed that statement. Azerbaijan initiated military action against the Armenians of Nagorno-Karabakh, using arms received from the CIS and taking advantage of the fact that Armenia had not yet received its share of CIS weaponry. More than 5,000 people have died in the war over who will control the enclave (and perhaps as many more in fighting in June alone).

Azerbaijan's relations with the rest of the CIS and with Turkey and Iran depend on the position they take on Nagorno-Karabakh. The views of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) are guarded, and aimed at preserving the enclave's previous status. But it is naive to think there are powers that can do this without genocide and wide-ranging warfare, which would involve not only Nagorno-Karabakh, Azerbaijan, and Armenia but also Turkey, Iran, and Russia. International recognition of Nagorno-Karabakh and the establishment of an internationally adminis-

tered zone could be the path out of the war, but the CSCE must change its position for that to happen.

All the former republics of Central Asia are members of the CIS. The majority are ruled by former leaders under the union who turned in their party tickets, and by the same party, which has changed its name. However, the stormy events of May and September in Tajikistan are a sign of instability. All the former republics (except Kyrgyzstan) signed an agreement on protecting their borders with Russia, Kazakhstan, and Armenia. Foreign policy is oriented more toward Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, and the Arab East than the CIS, since there is little hope of aid from the latter.

When part of the Soviet Union, Central Asia had the widest gap between the living standards of its insignificant wealthy minority and the overwhelming majority who lived in poverty (a colonial picture). In Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Kyrgyzstan in the 1980s, over 50 percent of the population lived below the poverty line. Clan struggles complicate the job of governing in these states, as well as an entrenched narcotics mafia (which has become a serious problem for the countries in the region and threatens to become a problem for the CIS and the rest of the world). It looks as if Central Asia's development will not be a democratic one.

Kyrgyzstan is the exception. It is one of Central Asia's poorest states, the poverty there exacerbated by a recent earthquake. President Askar Akayev, a physicist, wants to hold to a democratic course. He insisted during the ratification process for the new constitution that an article declaring "the land, resources, and waters belong to the Kyrgyz people" be changed to "the land, resources, and waters belong to the people of Kyrgyzstan." An agreement with Russia guarantees the rights of Kyrgyzstan's Russian-speaking population. This new state could become a democratic model for the rest of Central Asia, but it will require the West's active support.

Kazakhstan, the second-largest former republic, has reasserted its ties and its equality with Russia through a treaty of friendship and cooperation that is in the spirit of President Nursultan Nazarbayev's proclamation that "Kazakhstan will never be anybody's underbelly." Nazarbayev apparently is skeptical about the future of the Commonwealth, and has said, "we don't need to drag anyone by the ears into the CIS." Kazakhstan is confidently developing relations with India, Pakistan, Turkey, South Korea, Japan, Europe, and the United States. In the process it has attracted foreign investment in mining and refining, with the hard currency received from these deals being used to improve other sectors of the economy.

Kazakhstan's domestic situation is more stable than Russia's, despite the fact that the city of Karaganda was one of the centers of the miners strikes in 1989. Ethnic conflict has been minimal, but the growing Cossack

movement could become a destabilizing factor since over 50 percent of the population is Russian-speaking. The project for a new constitution in which both the Kazakh and Russian languages have equal status and which stresses guarantees for human rights, has the approval of Western experts but has elicited protests from national organizations that want to create a single "Turkic space" composed of Kazakhstan, Central Asia, and the Transcaucasus (Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan). I think the president, whose character is a mixture of pragmatism, an active desire for democracy, and authoritarianism (within limits), and who has the confidence of the people, can bring about reforms without social explosions. But it is important that no destabilizing impulses come from Russia.

Belarus has consistently supported Russia in the CIS but now seems to be planning to leave the Commonwealth, as manifested in decisions to create its own currency and army and in its refusal to sign the defense pact. This former republic, which suffered more than any other in World War II and was damaged by fallout from the nuclear accident at Chernobyl, is in extremely difficult economic and psychological straits. Its president, Stanislav Shushkevich, has managed to avoid conflicts with his neighbors in the CIS, but his situation in parliament is not simple. The republic is about to have a referendum on re-election to parliament, and it is not certain that Shushkevich will retain his post. Perhaps leaders of the Popular Front, with a more nationalistic platform, will come to power. If they do, the present foreign policy orientations on Ukraine and Belarus's European neighbors will hold, but the same cannot be said with certainty about ties to Russia.

Relations between Russia and Ukraine are already strained. Conflict began in August 1991 when the Russian parliament reclaimed the Crimea, a former Russian territory that had been annexed to the Ukraine during Soviet rule, and also expressed solidarity with Russians living in the eastern border regions of Ukraine. Tensions abated, but flared up again after the CIS was founded, the direct result of vague agreements on strategic forces, an undivided army, and continuing pretensions to the Crimea on the Russian side. These will not lead to war, but friendly relations have been lost for a long time.

Domestically, Ukraine suffers from fewer conflicts than Russia. The presidency of Leonid Kravchuk, which has managed to cooperate both with the old nomenklatura and the leaders of Rukh, the opposition movement that brought him to power, remains stable. In foreign policy Ukraine is oriented toward Europe, chiefly Germany, and is improving relations with Belarus to the north. It takes a neutral position in the conflict between Russia and Moldova, although it could speak even more forcefully than Russia about its

"fellow citizens" in the Trans-Dniester region (where there are more Ukrainians than Russians).

THE QUESTION OF RUSSIA

Russia, even after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, remains a great state of 150 million people, with a colossal territory and abundant natural wealth. But if we exclude the former republics now caught up in wars, it is torn by the sharpest contradictions—contradictions between Moscow and the autonomous republics, regions, and oblasts. There is also a struggle between the old nomenklatura and the new one in process of formation. (Moscow, like any capital, is a city of bureaucrats and nomenklatura, in this case from three systems—the state, party, and army. These people largely "determine the weather" for all Russia and have no intention of bowing out.)

There are contradictions between president and parliament because Yeltsin was elected a year after the parliament was seated, and under more democratic conditions. As a result, there is still no law on buying and selling land and no policy for attracting foreign investment. There are many contradictions in the economic reform program, which was begun late, with the liberation of prices before broad privatization, which instantly bankrupted 99 percent of the population.

The course of reform is paradoxical: as prices for consumer goods have jumped (some are up fiftyfold!), the markets have not filled with more goods but instead are almost empty. The main contradictions of the last year: conversion of the defense industry to the production of civilian goods apparently will not take place, and Russia will take over the arms market that was the Soviet Union's. The promised sharp reduction of the army will not take place, either. Troop strength is around 2.5 million, which means the military will continue to strain the budget, with all the concomitant consequences. Why is such a large army needed? To fight whom? Thus the fears of Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine—that once they give up their nuclear potential they will be defenseless before Russia—are not groundless. Social tensions in Russia are increasing wildly, extreme nationalistic tendencies are growing, and the Communists are active, uniting with the Christian Democrats and some of the old unions. There is fertile soil for this bloc in the rapid division of society into millions of beggars and a handful of millionaires, with no middle class; to this can be added the unemployment of many army officers.

Russia is losing friends (Armenia and perhaps Georgia) and gaining enemies (Ukraine, Moldova, Azerbaijan). The speaker of the parliament's statement that Ossetia could be annexed to Russia if its people so wish and in accordance with its policies in Trans-Dniester demonstrates the vagueness of Russian national policy, not the defense of the democratic principle

of self-determination, because otherwise Russia would have to extend it to Nagorno-Karabakh and some of its own autonomous regions. The future will show what the country will become. But even if reform is not halted by a social explosion, peace and abundance will not come to Russia's citizens soon. This process will be more difficult than in the other CIS countries because Russia is large and made up of many ethnic groups, is unwilling to give up the dominance of the military in the budget, and has a messianic mentality.

A PLEA FOR ARMENIA

It is hardest to write about Armenia. This former republic was cut off on all sides to suit the Leninist idea of socializing the entire Islamic world. Its geopolitical situation in a historically created hostile environment does not give it an outlet to the West. Poor in land and natural resources, especially fuels, only nuclear energy can give it economic independence. The country has been devastated by earthquakes, which caused it to shut down its only nuclear reactor, and by a three-year economic blockade by Azerbaijan, which is waging war with the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh (which has been blockaded for four years).

Armenia is dying. Only people with bad intentions fail to see this. But the international organizations that were silent for four years, even though blockades against peaceful populations are forbidden by the Geneva Conventions, accused Armenia of aggression when its troops recently tried to create a corridor for delivering humanitarian aid to Nagorno-Karabakh. The West is silent about the fact that of the 130,000 tons of grain intended for the relief of Armenia, 126,000 ended up in Azerbaijan, or that the Finnish houses sent in 1989 to the earthquake-damaged area of the country have been used for Azerbaijani settlements. Pitted against the 200,000 Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh is the full might of Azerbaijan, which was supported at first by the army of the Soviet Union and not of the CIS.

As I listened in June to reports from the World Ecology Forum and agreed with the points about the need to save the ecosphere, I thought about the need to save those who have been placed on the brink of extinction by fate and people, politics and ideology. All the humanistic ideas, all the words about a New Europe will be only empty demagoguery if one morning we hear that there is no more Armenia, which was a cradle of civilization and Christianity. How does one write about the future of the country when there is a war going on to exterminate it? I do not know.

THE END OF ANOTHER MYTH

We lived in myths for decades. Myths fell. Others were created. The myth of the CIS is dying. The process of signing bilateral agreements is beginning. God grant that they be more than mere fiction. The next stage will obviously be the formation of blocs. The Central Asian

bloc: Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan. Azerbaijan will lean toward it. The Western bloc: Ukraine, Belarus, and perhaps Moldova. And the Central bloc: Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Of course things will not be absolutely clear-cut—Islam will have an effect on Kazakhstan and especially Kyrgyzstan, and there may be conflicts in the Central Asian and Western blocs. But the predicted and even announced union has not come about.

The future of the countries of the former Soviet Union and Europe, their peace and world peace, no longer depend on the East-West juxtaposition. Freed from the threat of a third world war, humanity still could choke on the blood of hundreds of small internecine wars. The experience of the last few years has shown that the struggle for self-determination is unstoppable, no matter what sacrifices it demands. Lithuania, Latvia, Turkmenistan, Yugoslavia, Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Trans-Dniester. The list can be extended, but this is enough to make my point: no matter how international organizations resist it, they will have to recognize the right of people to self-determination and to separate it irrevocably from the right to inviolable borders. Borders fall from outside the state. People determine themselves inside states.

Peace missions cannot keep repeating that conflicts must be settled peacefully. They must bring concrete proposals for compromise (compromise is movement by both sides). Federalization, demilitarized zones, zones of international supervision, protectorates, total independence—for each case there will be a different solution, but with complete guarantees for the rights of ethnic minorities remaining in the territories. The mechanisms for this process must be developed. We must change the tactics of peace missions, which now wait until blood has been shed and conflicts are resolved not by right but by might.

And still, what will happen to our country—excuse me, our many countries—caught up in the speeding process of disintegration and its strange bedfellow, the process of becoming? Which is stronger in our life today I do not know. On the level of daily life everything that was bad, still is. Even worse! Sometimes I ask myself, was there ever that August? Maybe it never happened.

But August 1991 did happen. It destroyed communism and the world's strongest bastion of communism—the Soviet Union. And from that moment began a new, post-August time in which hope appeared.

Revolutions are made quickly. But the process of creation is long and tedious; it takes many years of hard work. We must create our country and ourselves. As a Radio Liberty listener wrote: "We destroyed our prison, but for some reason we expect the jailers to keep bringing swill to our cells." That is an accurate description of our situation today. ■

As Stephen White surveys the attempts to implement democratic institutions in Russia, he asks an essential question: "Are these the first months of a democratic Russia or simply postcommunism, or even a new form of authoritarianism?" The answer is not entirely optimistic.

Russia's Experiment with Democracy

BY STEPHEN WHITE

The end of Communist rule in the country of its origin was widely celebrated as a victory for democracy. For the participants there was certainly no doubt that long-standing traditions of political passivity had been replaced by an active citizenry firmly committed to the new institutions of representative government that had been established in the late 1980s. For Russian President Boris Yeltsin, speaking just after the collapse of the August 1991 hard-liners' coup against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev, the people had "thrown off the chains of 70 years of slavery." For *Izvestia*, speaking editorially on August 22, democracy had "taught the people not to be silent"—a reference to Pushkin's *Boris Godunov*, in which the Russians of the time, invited to welcome the False Dmitrii, had, in a celebrated phrase, "kept quiet." And for some, the defeat of the coup and the subsequent demise of the Communist party was nothing less than the "end of history."¹

The changes that have taken place in Soviet and Russian politics since the late 1980s, and in particular after the attempted coup, have certainly held out the prospect of a "second Russian Revolution" that exhibits the characteristics of democratic rule. One of the clearest signs that this is possible, as any visitor will have noticed, is the end of political orthodoxy in the mass media. On the streets and in the underpasses of larger cities, almost anything goes: monarchism, dietary fads, businessweeklies, horoscopes, even orthodox communism. An elected parliament wrestles with an elected president over the composition of the

government or the level of direct taxation. A constitutional court sits to determine the legality of presidential decrees. Republics and regions can declare independence; ordinary citizens can emigrate if other countries will take them.

Yet there is talk of a "Russian Weimar," and few governments have survived the levels of inflation and mass poverty that confront Boris Yeltsin and his colleagues. The press is free but finding it difficult to adjust to market conditions and many papers and journals have collapsed, with some survivors dependent on government subsidies. Are these the first months of a democratic Russia or simply postcommunism, or even a new form of authoritarianism?

In answering this question, three features of the postcommunist Russian system are especially significant. The first is the weakness of law, in particular judicial institutions that can maintain the boundary between state and society. The attempted coup in 1991 by the "State of Emergency Committee" was at least nominally legal. Vice President Gennadi Yanayev assumed presidential authority on the basis of Article 127(10) of the constitution, which specified that if the president were unable to perform his duties "for any reason" his powers would pass automatically to his deputy. Yanayev's assertion that Gorbachev could not do his job "because of the state of his health" was clearly untrue—despite heavy pressure, no Soviet doctor could be found to back it up—but certification of the president's incapacity was not formally necessary. A state of emergency was declared "in certain localities" of the Soviet Union (although the law on emergencies required that these localities be specified) and the Soviet parliament was convened to approve this action, as required by law, but in any case the president had the right to declare a state of emergency on his own authority.

The defeat of the coup, by contrast, has been followed by a series of decrees that have shown little awareness of the need in a democratic system to respect the form as well as the content of the law. One of the first such arbitrary actions was the decree Yeltsin

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¹For the most recent version of this thesis see Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: The Free Press, 1992).

issued immediately after the coup that banned a number of newspapers—for the most part those the Emergency Committee had allowed to appear. Under the Law on the Press of June 1990, however, a newspaper may be suspended or banned only if it advocates the forcible overthrow of the government. Whatever their criticisms of Gorbachev and his colleagues, *Pravda*, *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, and the other newspapers concerned had not been advocating any action of this kind. In any case, the law says the banning or suspension of a newspaper must be the result of a court decision, not a politician's directive, and come only after evidence in support of the charges has been produced and, if necessary, contested. As *Izvestia* pointed out on August 24, there were "quite a few precedents" in world history for actions of this kind, but they had always been associated with coups, never with democratic transitions. "The power of the government to decide where information in the press is 'accurate' and where it is 'false,'" the paper declared in words that could have come straight from John Stuart Mill, "is the first step to dictatorship."

Nor, it appeared, was there an adequate legal basis for the banning or suspension of the Communist party of the Soviet Union. Under the law on public associations adopted in October 1990, the party could be suspended only under a state of emergency, and one was no longer in force after the coup had collapsed and the Emergency Committee's actions had been repudiated. Similarly, the existing law did not allow the nationalization of the Communist party's property or that of any other public organization. Under the law, the property of liquidated organizations reverts to the state; but the Communist party had not been liquidated, and only the Soviet Supreme Court could adopt a decision to that effect.

The party was banned outright in November 1991 by a Russian presidential decree on the grounds that the coup had been the "logical outcome" of party policies; its publishing houses were liquidated in December 1991, again in technical violation of the law; and in January of this year the party's frozen assets—4.3 billion rubles and some 17 million in United States dollars—were arbitrarily transferred to a state fund for social security. Yeltsin's legal adviser, attempting to justify these measures, insisted that the Communist party had been not a party but a "party-state"; yet even if this had been the case, it did not provide adequate justification for the party's suspension under Russian or Soviet law.

Weakness of law was not simply a function of the Russian government or presidency. During 1990, for example, all 15 republics adopted declarations on sovereignty under which their own laws took prece-

dence over those of the Soviet Union; Article 74 of the Soviet constitution specified exactly the opposite. Gorbachev himself, despite his commitment to a law-based state, issued a decree on "economic sabotage" in January 1991 in an attempt to prevent hoarding, which allowed police to enter homes, despite the constitutional guarantee on the inviolability of the home. During 1991 and 1992 a series of autonomous republics extended the "war of laws" to the Russian republic by refusing to accept the supremacy of Russian laws, and the Tatar republic held a referendum on its new status in defiance of a Russian Constitutional Court ruling that it would be unlawful to do so.

Meanwhile, individuals and even local governments were refusing to pay taxes, although this obviously prejudiced the Russian state budget and the fulfillment of commitments to pensioners, students, and members of the armed forces. All this, a manifestation of what Soviet jurists have called "legal nihilism," is closer to the classical conception of anarchy than to a state based on the supremacy of the law; it certainly gives little reason to believe that the rights of ordinary citizens will be protected.

THE PROLIFERATION OF PARTIES

A second major weakness of the postcommunist order is poorly developed political structures. In particular, there are no nationally organized political parties that can offer a choice of candidates and programs at periodic elections, give some direction to public policy, and maintain a stable pattern of interaction with society. However, there is certainly no shortage of bodies that have adopted a designation of this kind. In Russia alone there were more than a thousand political parties, movements, and foundations, including 25 registered political parties, by the summer of 1992.

Some took the names of prerevolutionary parties, like the Constitutional Democrats; others, like the Union of Stalinists, looked back to the early Soviet years. Many of the new parties chose well-established labels, such as the Socialists and Liberal Democrats, but others were more inventive. There is a Humor party, and an Idiots' Party of Russia, whose slogan is "Give the people beer and sausage." A guide to the newly formed parties and associations that was published in late 1991 listed over 300 of them, including at least 9 anarchist parties, 17 monarchist parties, and 53 of a "national-patriotic" character. Even the chauvinist movement Pamyat has at least 10 distinct tendencies.²

However numerous, the new parties have serious weaknesses. Membership is limited, and not just by comparison with the Soviet Communist party, which at the time of its banning had a mass membership of 15 million and an inflow of at least 100,000 recruits a year. Some of the new parties keep membership totals

²See V. N. Berezovsky et al., *Rossiia: partii, assotsiatsii, soyuzy, kluby*, 2 vols. (Moscow: RAU-Press, 1991).

secret, others keep no central records and therefore have no figures of any kind to report, and there is some double counting. Those that report membership figures at all exaggerate considerably. The Liberal Democratic party includes on its roster all those who attended its first congress, including curiosity-seekers, and added the members of some national minority movements without their permission. A member of the Russian parliament, in the December 27, 1991, edition of *Sovetskaya Rossiya*, described the whole party as a fiction, with an entirely imaginary national structure and only a few hundred real members.

Allowing for these and other distortions, the Russian Communist Workers' party, with 150,000 members, appears to be the largest of the new parties; the People's party of Free Russia, led by Russian Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi, is the second largest, and the Democratic Party of Russia, led by Nikolai Travkin, comes in third, with about 50,000 members. All the other parties, however, have significantly fewer members, and some claim no more than a hundred or so.

There is, in fact, some antipathy toward the concept of a political party, the very word "party" being deeply compromised after so many years as a synonym for single-party dictatorship. Seventy years of Soviet Communist party monopoly had led to a general association between party membership and careerism (few who have left the party have transferred their loyalties to other organizations). As K. Lozovsky, a teacher from the Vitebsk region, suggested in a letter to the January 10 *Izvestia*, "wouldn't it be better without parties altogether?" What is a party anyway? It is "always and everywhere a struggle for posts and positions" fed by a lust for power that is "stronger than any narcotic." Better, surely, to let the "demagogues and hypocrites, power-lovers and careerists, flatterers and opportunists" battle it out while ordinary people strengthen the spiritual qualities that have sustained them in the past. Asked in an *Izvestia* poll in March to identify a political force with which they associated their hopes for the future, 23 percent of Muscovites opted for the Russian president and 20 percent for businessmen, but only 4 percent placed their confidence in the Russian parliament or the new parties and movements in it.

Perhaps most fundamentally, the new parties lack a defined public constituency. How can the Democratic party and the Social Democratic party, for example, be distinguished from each other? Both, as *Literaturnaya gazeta* has pointed out, are in favor of social reform and the market, and both are opposed to the Communist party; but many of their views are reflected in the old Communist party itself, where being a member was "like membership in the Anglican Church for the average Englishman." Since they do not have some

anchoring in social interests, the new parties have become preoccupied with intrigue among their leaders and would-be leaders, and are most readily identified with the personalities who lead them; they are also prone to damaging divisions.

Democratic Russia, for instance, split last November when three of its constituent parties, including Travkin's Democratic party, formed "Civic Concord." This group in turn divided when Travkin and his party withdrew. Democratic Russia had already suffered the loss of some of its leading spokesmen, such as historian Yuri Afanaseyev, and the Democratic party had itself suffered a split in the spring of 1991 when chess player Gary Kasparov and a group of his supporters formally seceded. The Peasant party, formed last year, has already split. The Liberal Democratic party divided when a prominent member accused party leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy of being a KGB agent and left to form the Liberal Democratic party of Russia.

For many these are protoparties or leadership support groups, not parties in the commonly recognized sense. And this, it has been suggested, is because coherent social interests have not begun to crystallize. Without the formation of interests of this kind it is difficult for parties to develop a coherent program; the parties that have come into existence are based around a "small group of intellectuals" with original but often abstract ideas. Much more likely, for the immediate future, is the formation of movements of various kinds headed by popular individuals.³

Gorbachev, speaking to American senators in 1990, described the Soviet Union as the "most politicized society in the contemporary world," but the elements in post-Soviet society are still extremely fluid, and it will clearly be some time before the former Soviet Union can expect to have a system with competing nationally organized parties that can offer a coherent alternative to the Soviet Communist party. Still, a poll by *Moskovskie novosti* in the summer of 1991 showed that 70 percent of the respondents agreed that "Russia's salvation would be a person able to lead the people and bring order to the country," a response reminiscent of a much older pattern of orientation to government in which parties and representative institutions held little place.

QUESTIONING DEMOCRACY

Finally, a third weakness of the emerging postcommunist order is that it appears to be based on a limited and qualified commitment to democratic values. It is clear, if polls are any guide, that the attempted coup was widely seen as illegal: 62 percent of people throughout the Soviet Union, and 73 percent in Moscow took this view, according to surveys conducted at the time. It is also clear that the public did not believe Gorbachev should have been displaced by the State of Emergency Committee: 55 percent, accord-

³See A. Galkin in *Mirovaya ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya*, no. 1 (1992), p. 57.

ing to another poll, thought his dismissal improper, as compared with the 22 percent who were willing to accept it. A large majority was opposed to the establishment of the Emergency Committee, and up to 92 percent were hostile toward the men who made up the committee. For a substantial proportion of people (60 percent among the urban population), a successful coup was likely to lead to widespread political repression. As the reported order for 250,000 pairs of handcuffs on the eve of the coup indicated, fears of this kind were not groundless.⁴

These numbers notwithstanding, many supported the coup and its apparent objectives. According to Gorbachev himself, speaking to journalists shortly after the coup attempt, support for the coup ran as high as 40 percent. Polls in Kazakhstan, conducted while the coup was in progress, found that it had and indeed continued to have a "real social base," with half or more of those surveyed backing it or at least not actively opposing it. Representative of the general sentiment or not, between 60 and 70 percent of the letters sent to the Russian state prosecutor on the subject supported the arrested conspirators; letters sent to the press after the coup had been launched but before it had been defeated revealed the same impulse. "May your hands be firm and your hearts pure," wrote a Moscow pensioner. "Force everyone to obey the Constitution, and introduce some public order. . . . I associate my hopes with you, and my belief in the rebirth of Russia." Or as 30 automobile workers wrote to *Izvestia*, "We welcome order and discipline, we welcome the new leadership." And what kind of victory had there been for democracy after the coup collapsed? Perhaps one in Moscow and St. Petersburg, but in the Bashkir autonomous republic, wrote V. Beloboky, "everything has remained as before" except that prices were rising even faster.⁵

Nor have the new institutions of government succeeded in developing a high level of support. Only 13 percent surveyed this spring thought their newly elected deputies had justified the hopes that had been vested in them, while 56 percent took the opposite view. And only 16 percent were satisfied with the work of the Russian parliament, with an even larger proportion—62 percent—dissatisfied. Early this year, only 12.3 percent had confidence in the Russian government, and fewer still had confidence in its most prominent members: Deputy Prime Minister Yegor Gaidar had the support of 8.5 percent of the public and Boris Yeltsin, with 80 percent support in the autumn of

1991, was down to 43 percent by March 1992. The main characteristic of public opinion on matters of this kind appeared to be "political alienation," with 45 percent believing that the deputies they elected "soon forget about our interests," and 31 percent said the leadership was "a particular group of people, an elite, that is exclusively concerned with its own interests."

Other surveys have suggested a relatively low level of attachment to minority rights and many of the conventions that sustain a democratic order. In the summer of 1991, for example, 30 percent of Russians favored the death penalty for homosexuals; another 30 percent favored compulsory medical treatment, and only 10 percent regarded it as a private matter (in Central Asia support for the death penalty ran as high as 85 percent). A similar proportion, in a 1990 survey, were in favor of the "liquidation" of prostitutes; more than 20 percent favored a similar solution for drug addicts, the handicapped, and all "rockers."

In early 1992 a majority supported the ban to which the Soviet Communist party had been subjected and said the party itself should be put on trial (proceedings to this effect began in the Russian Constitutional Court in July). Calls were also heard to deny party members and officials the opportunity to work in public bodies. Democracy itself, according to a Russian poll earlier this year, was generally understood as "rigid control, order and the absence of conflict."

LEARNING DEMOCRACY

Gorbachev, in his address to the Central Committee in July 1991, promised that the party would seek a "civic accord" with other political groupings. The party would discuss common concerns and, where appropriate, enter coalitions with "the parties and movements that were close to it in spirit, [and] with all democratic forces." The draft program adopted at the plenum in turn identified the party with the construction of a "legal state" and a "civil society," based on "political and ideological pluralism," a division of powers, and guaranteed rights of citizenship.

Only the formation of such a democratic culture could sustain the post-Communist order that had emerged from the failure of the coup. And it was this democratic culture based on tolerance, respect for minority rights, and cooperation rather than confrontation, that some of the most thoughtful reformers began to advocate in the aftermath of the coup. Russians, it had been suggested at the outset of perestroika, would need some time to "learn democracy." The evidence of the early 1990s is that the educational process may be a lengthy one and that the establishment of formally democratic institutions will be of limited significance so long as the culture of democratic self-government continues to make little progress. ■

⁴*Izvestia*, August 24, 1991, p. 4. Surveys during the coup are reported in the All-Union Public Opinion Research Center's *Data Express* bulletin, August 21, 1991.

⁵*Izvestia*, August 31, 1991, p. 3, and October 21, 1991, p. 3.

The high hopes that surrounded the initial stages of market reform in Russia are turning to pessimism as the realities of "shock therapy" take their toll. "At this point Yeltsin does not seem to have the determination to push through such changes, or to be willing to take on those in powerful places who are still ideologically opposed to privatization. Yet unless something is done to increase the output of food and consumer goods quickly, the whole reform process, and Yeltsin himself, could be in jeopardy."

Needed: A Russian Economic Revolution

BY MARSHALL I. GOLDMAN

With the advantage of 75 years of hindsight, many argue that the Russian Revolution of 1917 was a futile failure—that Russia, not to mention its people and its economy, would have been better off if it had never occurred. In the attempt to make the Soviet Union into a new world, as many as 50 million people lost their lives through collectivization, arbitrary trials, and war. And what once seemed a vibrant economy and fearsome war machine has been reduced to a struggling barter system with an oversized and demoralized industrial base unable to feed or house its own people.

In 1985, Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev realized the enormity of the Soviet mistake and began to undo much if not all that those responsible for the revolution had viewed as accomplishments. Unfortunately, this only seemed to make matters worse. In an effort to remedy the economic shortcomings not only of communism but of the Gorbachev era, Russian President Boris Yeltsin and his team of economic advisers have in turn embarked on a far-reaching set of reforms. If successful, they will basically reverse the economic revolution associated with collectivization, nationalization, central planning, and perestroika. While there have been some positive results, improvement thus far has been meager, and in many instances the changes have been counterproductive. There is concern that this "Second Russian Revolution" will turn out to be as flawed as its predecessor.

THE TROUBLE WITH CENTRAL PLANNING

So what exactly is Yeltsin trying to do in Russia, and what are his prospects? The Russian president's primary goal is to transform the remains of the centrally

planned, state-owned economy into an economy in which managerial and consumer decisions are based on market signals and the means of production are privately owned—in other words, he wants to make the economy into the opposite of what it was in the mid-1980s. Disappointed by the results of central planning, Yeltsin has concluded that only through such a transformation will Russia retain the support of its people and achieve a place on the world economic stage.

Under the best of circumstances this would be difficult. In the case of the Soviet Union, it is not only that economic managers were promoted for showing their disdain for the market but that industry was purposely structured to facilitate central planning and command mandates rather than market responses. For at least 60 years everything was done to discourage the public or managers from any market tendencies.

In the 1950s and 1960s, for example, those discovered manufacturing products privately were likely to be charged with economic crimes and executed. State factories were intentionally built on a large scale and as monopolies, with little or no concern for profit maximization. White elephant projects were prized under Soviet gigantomania. Premiums were actually given to managers who wasted raw materials. Moreover, neither managers nor tenants had to make more than token payments for land purchases or rent; Soviet propagandists boasted that the country's citizens typically spent only 5 or 10 percent of their income on housing, compared to 25 percent or more for most Americans. Similarly, charges for utilities such as water, electricity, and natural gas were zero or only slightly higher. Nor did managers have to pay interest for the use of capital during most of the period. The overall effect was that resources (land, raw materials, and capital) in short supply in other countries were treated in the Soviet Union as essentially free goods for which supplies were limitless.

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Prices on most consumer goods were rarely altered, with the result that prices did not work to allocate goods as they do in the West. Yet factory managers with only limited supplies of merchandise available or with brand-new products needed some criteria for determining who should get them. Not having the option of raising prices—which in Western economies usually discourages less desirous buyers—Soviet managers found it expedient to serve senior party officials first. The *nomenklatura*, as they were called, were able to obtain scarce items at low prices in stores set aside for them and off limits to the general public. Anything left over would be sent on to regular state stores, where people obtained goods either with ration coupons or by standing in line.

The attitude toward foreign businesses and foreign trade was similarly perverse. Ministry of Foreign Trade officials prided themselves on their ability to discourage foreign involvement in the economy; until 1987 there was no such thing in the Soviet Union as a joint venture with a foreign firm. It was forbidden to bring rubles into or take them out of the country. Similarly, foreign exporters and importers were prohibited from direct contact with Soviet buyers and sellers. Those transactions that were agreed to were hamstrung by all kinds of red tape.

By these means a culture was deliberately created that encouraged economic behavior often the exact reverse of Western norms. This is no exaggeration. Intrigued as to how former central planners trained to ignore market signals could sell billions of dollars worth of petroleum effectively on Western commodity markets, I asked the chairman of Gosbank, the Soviet central bank, how he prepared his people. "Simple," he replied. "I tell them to do just the opposite of what they would do in Moscow."

For decades most of the country's leaders trumpeted the Soviet system's superiority. As a Soviet official proudly proclaimed to a Japanese businessman, "Unlike in the West, in the Soviet Union 'Time is not money.'" But eventually the Soviet government came to realize that despite heavy political and police repression and the best of wishful thinking and distortion, even in the Soviet Union time was money. Equipment left to idle on a construction project for months at a time entailed a significant cost. Wasting raw materials had a cost, even in a country as rich as the Soviet Union; after all, even with free love there is the risk of exhaustion. Much of the inefficiency was camouflaged for years by the export of what seemed like unlimited quantities of petroleum and natural gas. Eventually, however, as the most easily exploited raw materials were depleted, the Soviet Union found itself unable to continue the deception. By the beginning of the 1980s it was no longer possible to export enough to offset the economic waste and military overindul-

gence, and the folly of the central planning system could no longer be denied.

GORBACHEV'S SUPPLY-SIDE DEPRESSION

Yuri Andropov, who succeeded Leonid Brezhnev as party general secretary in January 1982, seemed to understand the need for change in the system, but it was his protégé, Mikhail Gorbachev, who began to seek it. Calling his economic reform effort *perestroika* (restructuring), Gorbachev knew he had to make significant changes in the economy but he did not know what those changes should be or how to implement them. By the time he was forced to resign as president of the Soviet Union in December 1991, the economy was in shambles. Gross national product was declining between 20 and 25 percent a year, inflation was skyrocketing at an annual rate of 1,000 percent, and the budget deficit amounted to between one-fifth and one-quarter of GNP. Gorbachev had created something never seen before: a supply-side depression.

Gorbachev was not solely responsible; anyone else attempting to deconstruct the centrally planned economy would probably have had similar problems. The essence of the supply-side depression was that factory managers found that once something happened to one of their suppliers, there usually was no other source of supply—a by-product of the central planning system and the effort to eliminate duplication in production and emphasize simple, large-scale monopolist manufacturers. (This also explains why until recently over 70 percent of all the machinery manufactured in the Soviet Union was produced by only one source.) In the new market economic environment, the state suppliers, whether privatized or still under state control, were almost always monopolists, with no interest in raising output or lowering prices. And if for some reason the monopolist's factory was forced to close, its customers had nowhere else to turn, since there were no competitors. This had a domino effect.

Unfortunately there were many dominos, since the Soviet Union's economic difficulties were compounded by political fratricide. The republics began to declare sovereignty and to restrict if not sever what once had been domestic trade but which overnight became the "export" of goods to other countries. In the economic turbulence that characterized Gorbachev's last days, each republic and even many of their subdivisions sought to protect their own residents by refusing to allow goods to move outside their borders.

The problem might not have been so serious if Gorbachev had managed to nurture a vibrant private sector whose entrepreneurs could have created a competitive environment and served as alternate sources of supply. However, when he first began to authorize private enterprises in 1987, Gorbachev restricted entry into the private sector to students and pensioners

because of concerns about massive flight from state industries and a resulting collapse of industrial output. Those few entrepreneurs bold enough to set up on their own found that the state's historic refusal to cater to consumer needs had created great pent-up demand and they could realize huge profits simply by opening a cooperative restaurant or reselling vodka or cigarettes. The trick, of course, was to find an independent source of supply in a country where the state controlled most of the resources. But the high profits for those who obtained supplies allowed them in turn to pay high prices to the manufacturers.

Profits were so large, in fact, that these new enterprises immediately became targets for criminal elements and racketeers. These hoodlums, referred to collectively as "the mafia," have come to control virtually all private restaurants and retail operations, as well as most trucking operations. In mid-1992 the Russian Ministry of the Interior reported that these racketeers were grouped into 260 gangs stretching across the country, at least 200 of which had national or international ties. The racketeering operations demand monthly payments and effectively restrict entrepreneurs' freedom to enter the market, thus limiting supplies and thereby maintaining high prices. This in turn perpetuates the monopolistic structure of the Soviet economy and the tendency toward a supply-side depression.

Like so many other presidents in doubt about how to solve economic problems, Gorbachev called in some economists. Before he was through he had considered 11 or 12 different economic plans, some addressing specific problems, some comprehensive, some emphasizing machinery, and some proposing production of more consumer goods. But in the end Gorbachev either rejected them or found himself unable to implement them. He also discovered that economists do not always have the answers.

Of course the economists cannot be blamed for everything that went wrong. Gorbachev's indecision and his reluctance to move beyond socialism and insist on private property would have jeopardized the best economic plans. The combined effect, however, was an economic crisis of unusual proportions.

YELTSIN AND GAIDAR TRY TO STEER

Recognizing the importance of immediate steps to cope with this inherited economic nightmare, Yeltsin set out his economic blueprint late last October. The plan was based on the suggestions of an economic team led by Yegor Gaidar, a 35-year-old economist with no prior government experience. Gaidar's emphasis was on the need to introduce market elements such as market-determined prices and fluctuating currency exchange rates.

While their motives deserve praise, the approach Gaidar and his team took compounded Russia's eco-

nomie difficulties. Although decisive action was certainly called for, the policy announcements caused enormous confusion, because Gorbachev was still president of the Soviet Union and Yeltsin and his advisers could speak only on the behalf of Russia. (In fact, there were strong hints that Gaidar preferred a "Russia first" policy that rejected full cooperation with other republics and indeed sought to split them apart.) But since Russia controlled the central bank, the money supply, and the largest share of production, especially in energy, there was no way the rest of the Soviet republics—even the Baltic states—could insulate themselves from Yeltsin's decisions.

When Yeltsin announced he planned to decontrol prices on December 16, he precipitated an immediate rise in prices across the country several weeks in advance of that date. After desperate pleas from several of the other republic leaders, Yeltsin agreed to a two-week postponement, until January 2, 1992. Yet by early December it was already all but impossible to find anyone selling at the old subsidized state prices, since goods were all being funneled out of the state stores into the private sector or the black market. This made January 2 less of a shock for the public than it might have been. Nonetheless, the early announcement and subsequent postponement caused a crisis of confidence in a leadership that did not seem able to coordinate its policies.

The public's skepticism began with Gorbachev, but soon there were similar doubts about the abilities of most members of the Yeltsin government. As noble as their aspirations may have been, Gorbachev and to a lesser extent, Yeltsin, were not clear about the objective of their economic changes. For example, in his initial 1985 pronouncement on reform, Gorbachev saw his main purpose as the intensification and acceleration of machine tool production. Later he broadened his scope, but neither he nor Yeltsin ever seemed to realize that the priority should be making daily life better for the average Soviet consumer—which meant focusing first on the production of more food and consumer goods. In order to do this as quickly and efficiently as possible, the reformers should have encouraged private businesses and farmers by offering them market incentives.

A good economist, Gaidar came much closer to understanding what his task should be, but even he neglected the ultimate importance of the consumer. His main concern was instead a more rational allocation of resources. That meant restoring the value of the ruble, which meant halting inflation, which meant cutting budget expenditures including the subsidization of low prices, which meant freeing up prices and allowing them to create an equilibrium between supply and demand, which has always been the best way to put a stop to shortages, queues, or excess inventories. In most societies a more rational allocation of re-

Main Elements of the Russian Economic Reform Program

- End price controls and subsidies on all but 15 major commodities. As of January 2, 1992, prices were to be determined by sellers, reflecting supply and demand.
- Balance the national budget. As a second-best, reduce the deficit to 5% and then 3% of GNP.
- End or at least reduce subsidies to factories and farms, and slash military expenditures.
- Attempt to introduce new taxes: an income tax, value added tax, and taxes on imports and exports.
- Curb the printing of money and introduce credit restraints.
- Eventually seek to privatize industry, and debate whether private ownership of land, including farmland, should be allowed.

sources also leads to improvement in the consumer's lot. But neither Gaidar nor his advisers, Russian and Western, initially grasped the fact that Russia's institutional peculiarities—the consequence of decades of central planning and attacks on market behavior—would result in economic reactions different from what might occur almost anywhere else.

SHOCKING THE ECONOMY

The main policy tool of the Gaidar team was the introduction of market-determined prices, balanced national budgets, and monetary restraint. Described as “shock therapy,” this powerful dose of economic medicine was meant to jolt the sick economy into a more normal course of behavior. A time-tested strategy of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), shock therapy had also been proven effective by the young Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs in his work with governments in Latin America and Poland. Sachs began advising Gaidar last September, and strongly supported the use of similar methods in Russia.

While by no means a guaranteed cure, the IMF strategy has often helped countries with hyperinflation and collapsed economic production work their way back to economic health. Of course, just as in the treatment of mentally ill patients, shock therapy is almost always painful; the economic version brings, even when it succeeds, higher prices, bankruptcy for formerly subsidized firms, and unemployment. Some governments have been unable to withstand the political reaction to such treatment, although from an economic standpoint it is usually the correct procedure to follow, since higher prices have almost inevitably provided a more rational allocation of resources and a better life for the consumer.

The trouble with applying shock therapy to Russia was that the peculiarities of the Soviet system were

bound to prolong the process for so many years that even the incredibly patient Russians might not be able to endure it. While higher prices worked in part, they only reflected a demand side response. Goods began to reappear in the shops, but only because once prices went up, many consumers found themselves unable to buy things they had previously been able to afford, even if they had been required to wait in line for hours. After the price hikes some surveys reported that 29 percent of people interviewed said almost all their income went for food.¹ By mid-1992, as queues shrank and store shelves began to fill up, those with money could live very well. Those with lower incomes found themselves in penury.

The return of goods to the shops was a major accomplishment, but it did not mean that shock therapy had been a success. As some critics have charged, the reformers ended up with only the shock, not the therapy. The restraints on demand seemed to be working reasonably well, but the reformers had neglected the supply side. True, there was a release of inventory hoards. But for the most part, unlike after shock therapy in other countries, in Russia there was no increase in new production.

The failure of the increase in prices to stimulate production was primarily a consequence of the institutional rigidities of the centrally planned economy. The absence of private trade and private wholesaling, manufacturing, and farming meant there was virtually no one who might be induced by the higher prices to produce more goods. The managers of state factories and monopolies would be paid their salaries whether or not they increased production; in fact, they were probably better off with lower production and higher prices because black market or mafia operators would likely be able to pay them more under the counter. For that matter, a more effective and profitable operation would benefit the state, not the manager.

When asked why they had not done more to facilitate change on the supply side, the Gaidar reform-

¹*Economic Newsletter*, Russian Research Center, Harvard University, vol. 16, no. 9 (May 15, 1992), p. 1.

ers replied they had their hands full freeing prices; they had no time, they insisted, to break such institutional bottlenecks. From a bystander's point of view, this explanation is difficult to accept. At a minimum, Yeltsin and Gaidar should have announced that at the same time as or even before prices were decontrolled, peasants could take over the land and set up their own farms. They should also have proclaimed that anyone could sell or buy anything, anywhere he or she wanted. After several months' delay Yeltsin did in fact introduce both these measures, but with so many restrictions and so belatedly that they seemed to have little impact. Given the impossibility of doing everything at once, there obviously was not enough time to draw up and implement a code of commercial law, but the absence of modern commercial laws only added to the sense of inertia and disorder.

It was unclear whether Gaidar and his associates fully appreciated the inadequacy of their response. They had predicted it would be only a matter of months before conditions began to improve, and there was some improvement, such as the reappearance of goods in the shops. But at the same time industrial and agricultural production dropped or stagnated. There was little in the way of new production, and the level of unemployment began to rise. For Gaidar this was more or less expected. Yet how could he say the reforms were working when there was a drop in output? In Gaidar's words, "So far there has not been a single post-communist country that has undergone stabilization of the economy and the launching of market mechanisms without a recession of at least twenty percent." What he undoubtedly had in mind was that GNP and production would decline as subsidies to munitions producers and heavy machinery factories were cut back. Since most of these industries were obsolete, not competitive, and unable to switch to production of consumer goods, their collapse would be considered a positive development—indeed, a sign the reforms were starting to work. What Gaidar apparently overlooked was that if the reforms were ultimately to succeed, this drop in production would have to be more than offset by the opening up of new production facilities, particularly for food and consumer goods.

Gaidar's statement was also incorrect. He limited his analysis to eastern Europe, when he should have looked beyond Europe to China. While the Chinese reforms are by no means free of difficulties, they have been relatively successful, at least when gauged by the well-being of the population, and particularly the peasantry. The main difference between the Russian and Chinese reforms is that from the moment Deng Xiaoping assumed power in late 1978, he allowed the peasants to take control of the land and both rural and urban residents to establish new businesses, both for distribution and for production. China, like Russia, has not had much luck converting state-owned industry to

private ownership or military factories to the production of consumer goods, but cutbacks in the state sector have been more than compensated for by the new growth. As a result, GNP in China, except during 1989–1990, has consistently grown 9 percent or more a year. Equally important, that growth is not just a statistical artifact but a measure of real improvement. Until Gaidar understands and, more importantly, acts on the structural bottleneck in Russia, his reforms are unlikely to be successful.

WHAT'S GOING RIGHT

The criticism of Gaidar's reforms does not mean there is nothing positive to report. In contrast to the reforms under Gorbachev, there have been several hopeful developments. It is intriguing, however, that most of the changes for the better that seem to be occurring are less a result of deliberate government action than the public's spontaneous reaction to market forces; believe it or not, the invisible hand is at work. Perhaps that is as it should be. There is something oxymoronic about officials in Moscow ordering the public to adopt market responses. It is like being ordered to think for yourself.

The most important changes are the reappearance of goods on the shelves and the outpouring of people who have begun to buy and sell on streets across the country. Admittedly it is often a pathetic sight—a four-block-long corridor of women, most of them selling an item or two of the family furnishings or something earlier purchased or stolen from a state store. Some sellers are taking advantage of still erratic pricing structures—a form of profit-making arbitrage—and others are acting out of desperation. But whatever the case, it represents an acceptance of the market by a public that was thought to have become permanently antimarket. Equally important, some of these street vendors have gradually expanded and opened their own kiosks in a pattern reminiscent of China in 1979 and the early 1980s.

In the same way commodity markets have opened across the former Soviet Union. At one time there were more than 600—more than in the rest of the world combined. These markets operate mainly as crude wholesale markets. Brokers use them to find customers for products such as oil, trucks, shirts, and building materials. Prices are high and there is considerable illegality, often tinged with mafia interference. Moreover, as the country's economic condition deteriorates, it has become harder and harder to find goods to offer for sale, and as a consequence many of the commodity markets have closed. Nonetheless, such exchanges can potentially facilitate the flow of goods and fulfill the functions of a wholesaler. They also reflect the working of market and profit forces, since in almost all cases their founders were motivated by the enormous profits to be made by bringing buyers and sellers together.

Opportunities for profit also served to bring about the convertibility of the ruble. For years some Sovietologists argued that the ruble would never become convertible, and as long as there was central planning they were right. It was also said that nothing would happen until the government decided it was time to institute convertibility. The government finally set a date of July 1, 1992, but the ruble had become convertible long before then. While the authorities were distracted by other serious matters, those with dollars who needed rubles found they could usually get a higher rate than the one offered by the state bank by selling to those with rubles who wanted dollars. So hotels that rented their rooms for dollars but paid their staff in rubles, and institutions such as the Bolshoi Theater, which sold tickets to tourists for dollars, were approached by unofficial and unauthorized traders. Beginning November 3, 1989, the state-run Vneshekonombank (Foreign Economic Bank) began to conduct periodic currency auctions. These were open only to state enterprises, but they provided a reference point for private individuals who wanted to buy dollars in the interim. Innovative local traders began to buy dollars with rubles and use the dollars to import scarce consumer goods that they could then sell for large sums in rubles; often they used the proceeds to buy more dollars. Thus the ruble had become convertible, at least for relatively small amounts, some two and a half years before most economists became aware of it.

Another encouraging sign is that as concern about the availability of food increases, more and more Russians are planting their own gardens on unused land—sometimes even on state farms. This is as much a reflection of government weakness and permissiveness as it is of people's awareness of market opportunities or the urgency of laying in food before winter arrives. While most managers of state farms are unhappy about these takeovers, they are often unable to put the land to official uses, since the free labor that in pre-reform days was sent out from urban areas during harvest time must now be paid for, and managers lack the money. Whatever the motivation, the move to take over the land has the potential for expanding agricultural production, as it has done in China. And even though most of the takeovers in Russia so far have been by small gardeners, the movement could in the future facilitate the growth of private farming.

WHAT'S GOING WRONG

While market forces have stimulated some useful changes in Russia, they have also set in motion worrisome developments. For example, once in place the mafia has expanded and flourished. Growing faster than the market, and doing so at a time of inflation, it has managed to corrupt most of the government officials who might have been expected to move against it.

The effort to balance the budget and impose monetary restraint has also had its costs, as might be expected. Credit has become difficult to obtain. Most bankers refuse to lend money for more than two months at a time, and because of inflation they charge annual interest rates of 80 percent or more. Given that inflation in midyear was running at 1,000 percent a year, 80 percent interest is a bargain, but whatever the rate, most borrowers need the money for longer than a two-month period. Unable to get credit from the banks, managers of state enterprises have simply begun to postpone payment of bills and wages. By mid-1992, enterprises owed each other approximately 2.5 trillion rubles and their employees almost 100 billion rubles; many state workers are owed two to three months in back wages. (The credit crunch of course hits new private enterprises especially hard. To offset these pressures, it might make good sense for the United States and other Western countries to set up their own private lending banks in Russia, which would be charged with encouraging reform by providing credit only for private-sector activities.)

The danger is that a time may come when suppliers refuse to issue any more credit. This could cause the economy to collapse, just as with the bursting of a speculative bubble. Bankruptcy and the firing of thousands of workers would follow; there were already preliminary signs of such layoffs in mid-1992. Producing in such an environment becomes fraught with difficulties. The flow of raw materials is more likely to be disrupted, which only serves to compound the supply-side depression.

Social and political tensions are further heightened in this environment as the gap between rich and poor becomes more evident. Previously, class differences in the Soviet Union were defined by party membership. Now most of the old privileges are gone, replaced by market-determined differences. In the frontier atmosphere of the new Russia, with crime rampant and taxes easily evaded, income differentials can be enormous and it is not always clear that the money was earned honestly. Inevitably, differences in wealth and ambiguity about where the wealth came from create envy and resentment—especially among pensioners and others on low fixed incomes.

HOW MUCH MORE PATIENCE?

It is hard to see how the general public will continue to tolerate the deterioration of the economy, especially if unemployment begins to rise. Gaidar has unveiled what he has termed the second half of his reform package, which calls for an emphasis—even if belated—on privatization. Indeed, there have already been some emergency efforts at privatization, in cities like Nizhny Novgorod and on the island of Sakhalin. In these two instances the mayor of the city and the governor of the island went ahead with their own

reform projects without waiting for action by Moscow. On Sakhalin, for example, the governor, Valentin Fedorov, has gone beyond the privatization of state stores and decided to turn land over to private farmers and to help create new private industry—particularly fisheries. His efforts indicate that far-reaching reform is possible. But without the firm commitment and determination of leaders like him, further reforms will come slowly, if at all. At this point Yeltsin does not seem to have the determination to push through such changes, or to be willing to take on those in powerful places who are still ideologically opposed to privatization. Yet unless something is done to increase the output of food

and consumer goods quickly, the whole reform process, and Yeltsin himself, could be in jeopardy.

While Yeltsin and Gaidar still profess to be hopeful about their reform efforts, there is no clear sign they realize that reform requires net positive growth to offset the collapse of the state and military sector. Government overoptimism is reflected in a current Moscow joke. One of Gaidar's reformers finds himself on a train passing through a long narrow tunnel. Looking out the window, he exclaims, "I see light at the end of the tunnel!" To which the conductor replies, "You fool—that is another train." ■

"The United States cannot begin to solve the problems of the Soviet successor states; at the same time, it cannot afford to ignore them. Once it decides that the outcome of the political and economic upheaval in the 15 formerly Soviet societies matters to it—as indeed it does in a great many ways—it must be prepared to do more than offer pious advice. It must work with others, and it must do so without delay."

America's Search for a Policy toward the Former Soviet Union

BY ALEXANDER DALLIN

The collapse of the Soviet Union evoked a profound and slightly incredulous sigh of relief on the part of the United States, which for nearly half a century had been guided in its foreign and military policy by a sense of latent confrontation with the other superpower, and by its ever-present concern with the "Communist threat."

At the same time, the splintering of the Soviet empire, the instability that it engendered, and the emergence on the international scene of an array of new actors found the United States unprepared and uncertain. Questions abounded in Washington: How complete was the Soviet collapse? How benign or potentially dangerous were the new Russia and the other successor states? Which new states should the United States back? What were the strategic consequences of the union's dissolution? Some observers saw opportunities to gain geopolitical footholds and for economic, cultural, and ideological engagement. And there were potential rivalries for influence and resources with powers from Germany to Iran to think of.

While the dominant American impulse was to applaud the disappearance of the Communist leviathan, the initial reaction of President George Bush's administration was anything but positive. The administration's response reflected fear of global destabilization, and the lingering commitment to President Mikhail Gorbachev's Soviet Union—the same commitment that had led Bush to discourage Ukrainian moves toward independence, delay American recognition of the Baltic states in August 1991, and view Russian leader Boris Yeltsin at first with thinly veiled contempt.

Moreover, this election year—in which there is a widespread sense among Americans that the federal government is paying insufficient attention to domestic policy—has witnessed a peculiar skittishness in both the executive and the legislative branch when it has come to formulating and, especially, funding a "proactive" policy toward the Soviet successor states. This mirrors the unreconciled contradiction in United States posture: it is the sole surviving superpower (and likes to take credit for achieving that status), yet professes itself unable to assume new international obligations.

CHOOSING A COURSE OF ACTION

The United States had to choose between two options in dealing with the Soviet breakup. If it took what might be called the minimalist approach, it would conclude that the cold war was over; recognize the new states that had emerged in the territory of the former Soviet Union (if they met certain uncomplicated conditions); work to implement the arms control agreements signed by Gorbachev; and create the best conditions possible for American businesses to operate in the post-Soviet space. This strategy would satisfy some isolationist sentiment at home and would signal that the United States was not prepared to solve ethnic disputes in Central Asia or guarantee progress toward multiparty democracy among the Udmurts, Chechens, or Gagauz ethnic groups in other parts of the former Soviet state. Nor would the United States assume a major (and sure to be thankless) role in the transformation of the Soviet economic system into a market economy.

The other possible approach could be labeled activist. Optimists argued that the West had a "once-in-a-century" opportunity to restructure Eurasia, and that the outcome would be seen as a test of democratic and capitalist values. People in the former Soviet Union

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looked to the United States as the great alternative to the order that had just collapsed; they were more eager to borrow from American and other Western practices than ever before, and it was a matter of moral responsibility and self-interest—as well as of elementary human compassion—to help them in every possible way.

Pessimists who backed this approach called attention to the fate of Weimar Germany, whose political and economic collapse during the Great Depression had opened the door to Hitler. Failure to support the new democrats and economic reformers would strengthen the hand of extremists at both ends of the post-Soviet political spectrum—the neo-Communists as well as the anti-Western chauvinists and neo-fascists. Bush, Secretary of State James Baker 3d, and other public figures put forward the reasonable proposition that whatever funding was required to stabilize “Russian democracy” was sure to be a lot less than the United States had spent on defense during the cold war, and likewise a lot less than would be required from the United States if a nuclear Russia reverted to an imperial, confrontational, authoritarian regime or became a battlefield for contending warlords.

The Bush administration did in fact choose an activist approach, but it refrained from publicly formulating or advertising the choice in a compelling fashion, with the president only rarely referring to it. For a long time the administration failed to indicate just how much economic assistance it might be prepared to provide the former Soviet Union, either by itself or through international agencies. It failed to resolve the dispute between those who advocated a Russia-centered policy and those who would focus on supporting the non-Russian successor states, beginning with Ukraine. It failed to say to what extent the United States would support and participate in multilateral peacekeeping operations on what had been Soviet soil. And it failed to make clear how deeply the United States was prepared to involve itself in building democratic institutions, implementing economic reform, or propping up individual leaders in Russia or the other new states. It clearly wanted to make the area safe for American investments, and wanted to minimize violence there. But not until the middle of this year did the administration seem to follow a reasonably clear set of policy guidelines, and even then key administration figures continued to differ in their policy preferences.

The inability to develop a coherent policy early on reflected how confounded Washington was in dealing with the enormous problems of the post-Soviet transition, especially in a season when the administration and many members of Congress had their eyes on domestic challenges. At the same time, the delays and the reluctance in Congress to act on the proposed “Freedom Support” legislation for aid to the former Soviet Union not only frustrated policymakers but also

fostered the impression abroad—especially in what had been the Soviet Union—that the United States was an unreliable friend and ally, and that, except on arms control, the United States was mainly interested in flag-waving and providing cheap advice. In truth, while Baker’s speeches and congressional testimony were to the point, Bush failed to put his political weight behind the “Freedom Support” bill, perhaps sensing that it was not an issue he could profit from on the eve of a presidential election.

All the wider, then, loomed the gulf between policy objectives and available means. Some of the briefings at the time suggested that, while strong precedents for an American role in the transition from a totalitarian system and a major central command economy were lacking, the administration looked not so much to the model of the Marshall Plan, which had helped restore the European economies after World War II, as to the United States role in postwar Germany and Japan—a model of far more direct and extensive American involvement in promoting democracy on previously hostile terrain. But if this is what some policymakers had in mind, it was highly questionable whether Washington would act on it or the electorate would support it. In practice, many of the problems would remain for the next administration to deal with.

RECOGNIZING NEW STATES

The first step for United States policy was the establishment of diplomatic relations with the 12 republics that proclaimed their independence with the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991. (The three Baltic states—Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia—had declared themselves independent earlier in 1991, and the United States had recognized them after the hard-liners’ attempted coup against Gorbachev in August.) The United States and other powers promptly recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the Soviet Union under international law; Russia assumed the treaty obligations of the Soviet Union, and the United States backed Russia’s claim to the Soviet seat on the United Nations Security Council, in spite of its debatable legality.

The United States extended recognition to the 15 new states in several stages. On a number of occasions—most notably in an address at Princeton University in December—Baker had stipulated five conditions for recognition: endorsement of the principles of self-determination, acceptance of existing borders, support for democracy and the rule of law, commitment to safeguarding human rights, and respect for international law. One reason for the delay in recognizing some of the successor states was presumably doubt about whether they did in fact subscribe to some of these principles. But as the failure to stop the fighting in the Armenian enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan demonstrated, the United States in the end

missed the opportunity to make the protection of human rights and ethnic minorities a matter of international concern—in part, no doubt, because it wished to sidestep an escalating Christian-Muslim dispute.

Implicit in the recognition of the new states was the respect of all parties concerned for existing borders; any alterations were to be brought about only by “peaceful and consensual means.” The principle, accepted by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) since the Helsinki Accord of 1975, was of particular importance since several of the countries had territorial grievances. The implication was also that the United States did not plan to recognize new claimants to the status of independent states, be they Tatarstan or the Trans-Dniestrian republic. At the same time, the United States offered no initiative on the establishment of an international mechanism for the consideration of the region's border disputes (settling, for instance, the fate of the Slavic eastern sliver of Trans-Dniestria in a potentially Romanian Moldova).

BACKING AND CHOOSING

Most sensitive perhaps and potentially fraught with political consequences has been the question of which successor states the United States should back. Advocates such as former President Richard Nixon favored a Moscow-centered approach. In its simplest form, their “pro-Russian” argument cited Russia's predominance among the post-Soviet states in terms of territory, resources, population, and military and nuclear power; the historical centrality of Russia; and the country's more advanced economic development. The more sophisticated argument was, first, that it was Russia's fate that was most important for United States national security and, second, that democracy and a healthy economy in Russia were preconditions for democracy and a healthy economy in—indeed, for the very survival of—virtually all the other successor states, while the reverse was scarcely the case. American specialists, moreover, tended to be far more at home in Russia; the virtual neglect of non-Russian areas, languages, and cultures (except for the Baltic states) was perhaps the most serious shortcoming of American research and training on the Soviet Union.

The opposite argument held that over the centuries Russia had been an expansionist and imperial power, and that only coalitions around its perimeter had constrained its outward thrust. Thus statesmen with a proclivity toward realpolitik, such as former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former National Security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski, tended to stress the importance of ties to newly independent Ukraine, as did German and British specialists. Others advised playing the Islamic card against the Russians. All refused to preclude the possibility of a future aggressive Russia. Banking on the non-Russians gained favor

especially among those who foresaw the collapse of Russia's economy and polity, or perhaps a return to authoritarian, revanchist rule. Some proponents of a balance between Russia and the non-Russian states saw the need for international support for these weaker states to make such an equilibrium viable.

Officially, United States policy would deny the need to choose between Russians and non-Russians: all were “evenhandedly” recognized; all were admitted to international bodies; and all qualified as aid recipients. But this belies the continued, and perhaps natural, focus on Moscow, whether in regard to nuclear matters or archival access or central banking. On the other hand, it would not do to think of the non-Russians as a homogenized, united front. Armenians were bitterly battling Azerbaijanis; Ukraine sought to spin ties to potentially anti-Russian entities from Georgia to Tatarstan; Kazakhstan saw its interests served by continued close links to Russia as well as by new Central Asian combinations.

American observers were alarmed at militant speeches and aggressive gestures from Russian Federation officials from Vice President Aleksandr Rutskoi on down, and from the Ukrainians, Chechens, and Moldovans, among others. The United States had every interest in damping down Russo-Ukrainian tensions, and it may be assumed that behind the scenes it made its position clear to both Moscow and Kiev, and that it welcomed the accord reached by Yeltsin and Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk after Yeltsin returned from a trip to the United States in late June.

MILITARY MATTERS

Of the many dimensions of policy that called for decisions, the most important for the United States was assuring safe control over the nuclear weapons that had been in Soviet hands. Nor did the United States want to see the collapse of the Soviet Union allow the emergence of Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as new nuclear-armed states (the only former republics except Russia with nuclear warheads and tactical weapons on their territory). Except for a diffuse desire by these temporarily nuclear powers to use the weapons for political clout, none professed to have any interest in the permanent possession of nuclear arms, and consequently the United States and other Western powers were able to secure appropriate assurances. Compliance, however, was slow and doubts remain about whether all nuclear weapons in Ukraine and perhaps Kazakhstan will be turned over to their potential adversaries in Russia.

Given the weakness of the successor states, the United States was able to negotiate in June a more far-reaching agreement with Russia for the destruction of nuclear weapons by the end of the century—an agreement significant not only because it ensured an American advantage but because the new Russian

Warheads by Weapon System (US Forces)

	September 1990	September 1992	Levels under START	Levels under the Bush-Yeltsin Accord
Land-based Ballistic Missile Warheads				
MX/Peacekeeper	500	500	500	0
Minuteman III	1,500	1,500	900 ¹	500
Minuteman II	450	370	0	0
Total	2,450	2,370	1,400	500
Sea-based Ballistic Missile Warheads				
Poseidon (C-3)	1,920	0	0	0
Trident I (C-4)	3,072 ²	2,816 ³	1,536	768
Trident II (D-5)	768	768 ⁴	1,920	960
Total	5,760	3,584	3,456	1,728
Warheads on Bombers				
B-1B	1,520	1,520	1,520	0
B-2	0	0	320	272
B-52H	1,860	1,860	1,860	1,000
B-52G	1,056	528	0	0
Total	4,436	3,908	3,700	1,272
Totals	12,646	9,862	8,556	3,500

¹It is assumed that under START, 300 Minuteman III ICBMs will have one warhead each.

²Of the 3,072 warheads on Trident I (C-4) missiles, 1,536 are on 8 Trident submarines and 1,536 are on 12 Poseidon submarines, which are to be retired by January 1995.

³Two Poseidon submarines with Trident I (C-4) missiles are scheduled for retirement by the end of the 1992 fiscal year.

⁴A fifth Trident submarine with D-5 missiles is not counted here because it will not begin patrols until 1993.

Source: *Arms Control Today*, July–August 1992, p. 36.

Warheads by Weapon System (Soviet/Russian Forces)

	September 1990	September 1991*	Levels under START	Levels under the Bush-Yeltsin Accord
Land-based Ballistic Missile Warheads				
SS-11	326	296	0	0
SS-13	40	40	0	0
SS-17	188	176	0	0
SS-18	3,080	3,080	1,540	0
SS-19	1,800	1,800	0	0
SS-24 (silo)	560	560	560	0
SS-24 (rail)	330	360	360	0
SS-25	288	315	693	504
Total	6,612	6,627	3,153	504
Sea-based Ballistic Missile Warheads				
SS-N-6	192	176	0	0
SS-N-8	280	280	0	0
SS-N-17	12	0	0	0
SS-N-18	672	672	576	576
SS-N-20	1,200	1,200	720	720
SS-N-23	448	448	448	448
Total	2,804	2,776	1,744	1,744
Warheads on Bombers				
Bear-A/B	66	0	0	0
Bear-G	276	240	0	0
Bear-H (6)	162	162	162	0
Bear-H (16)	912	912	912	752
Blackjack	180	192	192	0
Total	1,596	1,506	1,266	752
Totals	11,012	10,909	6,163	3,000

*Latest data available for Soviet/Russian forces.

Source: *Arms Control Today*, July–August 1992, p. 36.

government admitted it could not afford a commitment to parity, or the matching of American capabilities missile by missile.

Finally, the United States was eager to proceed with the reduction of conventional forces in Europe, and the 1990 agreement on this with the Soviet Union was now extended to the successor states. One particular issue on which the United States and its European friends responded positively involved pressuring the CIS—in practice, the Russians—to withdraw forces from the Baltic states with some dispatch. This no doubt ran into political resistance in civilian and military quarters in Moscow.

WESTERN ECONOMIC INVOLVEMENT

The complex of economic problems in the post-Soviet states poses the most difficult policy quandary for the United States. The question was simplest for humanitarian aid, although providing such assistance has had its difficulties. Before and after the actual dissolution of the Soviet Union, there was widespread agreement on the enormous short-term needs of the population—if not to forestall starvation, then to alleviate severe shortages as an increasing number of people fell below the poverty line. No one disputed that the situation was catastrophic when it came to pharmaceuticals and medical supplies. There was an

earnest American effort to help, but it was not nearly so massive as had been expected nor, on a per capita basis, as substantial as the contribution of other countries, such as Britain and Germany.

The need for humanitarian assistance presented challenges to which there were solutions, costly and logistically awkward though they might be. This was equally true of the technical assistance that could be provided to the successor states. Along with other countries, the United States began this year to implement an array of projects, from low-cost food storage to safety programs for coal mines to advice on everything from efficient home heating to the training of Russian business interns.

Answers were a good deal more questionable, expensive, and political when it came to long-term capital assistance, credits, and loans meant to stabilize the Russian ruble (and make it convertible so that foreign investors could repatriate their profits); the same held with attempts to promote foreign investments, international trade, and joint ventures, and the rescheduling of Russian debt abroad. The Russian government favored far-reaching marketization of the post-Soviet economy, but there were no models or prescriptions for such a transformation, and the sequence of steps, the speed with which changes could be undertaken, and what it would all cost were unknowns. Soviet economists had produced one plan after another for stabilizing the currency, replacing planning with the market, and privatizing large segments of industry and agriculture, and American and other Western specialists had joined to support and elaborate alternative schemes. Until this year, however, little was done.

What was the "right" way to transform a socialist economy? If there were only contested answers in the successor states, the picture was even more murky in Washington. As a result, the Bush administration was glad to pass along responsibility to the IMF and World Bank, assuming that it could rely on their expertise in dealing with malfunctioning and underdeveloped economies, and that it could more easily "sell" American involvement in the post-Soviet economic transformation if it was part of a group effort. As for setting conditions for economic assistance, the administration knew it could count on a rigid approach by the IMF. The fund, as it turned out, tended to give little weight to the absence of and unfamiliarity with market mechanisms in Russia and most other successor states, and by slighting the social consequences of the reforms it insisted on, aroused a good deal of resentment in the countries it was supposed to be aiding.

At many levels of post-Soviet society, foreign nongovernment agencies and individuals are likely to have more impact than official United States projects. Foreign corporations will be in a better position to provide needed investments than will governments.

From McDonald's managers to experts on leave from Wall Street, from retired lawyers teaching seminars in business law to experts introducing American techniques of television advertising, Americans from the private sector are increasingly in evidence in the former Soviet Union. Often their work has extremely useful results, and the friendships they create can be lasting.

There is also ample room for naiveté, foolishness, and bitterness on both sides. There are many sharp American operators totally lacking in sensitivity to the local scene, and American crooks at work in a milieu unprepared for their dubious practices. There are Russians and others in the former Soviet Union able to take advantage of the goodwill of ignorant outsiders. And neither indigenous nor foreign businesspeople can as yet rely on a supporting structure of business law, dispute arbitration, legal advice, and predictable judicial practice.

In this unstable setting Americans, eager to help half-baked political groups and publications that proclaim their affection for democracy, readily provide computers, fax machines, and printers, many of which are soon resold on the black market for the personal profit of the supposed reformers. Sooner or later this sort of practice is bound to generate a backlash at both ends—disappointed Americans, as well as Russians and non-Russians turning against the peculiar American ethic to which they have been exposed (often by some of its worst representatives).

There is no way of policing the process. The United States experienced something like it in the Wild West a century or more ago, and other countries have had their analogues. But in addition to being prepared for a backlash, the best way to cope with it if it comes is to offset the negative experiences by multiplying positive ones.

WHAT IS TO BE DONE

The United States cannot begin to solve the problems of the Soviet successor states; at the same time, it cannot afford to ignore them. Once it decides that the outcome of the political and economic upheaval in the 15 formerly Soviet societies matters to it—as indeed it does in a great many ways—the United States must be prepared to do more than offer pious advice. It must work with others, and it must do so without delay. So far, the Bush administration has taken repeated public chiding from the likes of Richard Nixon and Democratic presidential candidate Bill Clinton to prod the White House into not overly vigorous action.

That the question of United States aid and credits has become entwined with the debate over domestic needs is tragic. A headline in the June 23, 1992, *San Francisco Chronicle* reads, "Too Bad U.S. Cities Aren't Former Communist States." Indeed, the crying needs of American cities are manifold. But it is precisely the collapse of the Soviet Union that frees up (or should

free up) ample resources both to launch a major domestic initiative and to underwrite limited assistance for the post-Soviet economies. The latter would be a one-time cost that would amount to less than 10 percent of the annual defense budget, which can now be substantially reduced without endangering United States security.

One can argue about the wisdom of the particular reform effort begun in Russia—the long delay before implementation; the “shock therapy” of huge price increases; the assumption that supply and demand would stabilize prices although government monopolies remain in many sectors; the widespread corruption in the privatization process; the relative neglect of the social consequences of economic reform; the drastic reduction of the standard of living. But a comprehensive reform is under way, and its failure would be a serious setback both for the Russian government and its Western friends and advisers. And while the American contribution is perhaps marginal, it is important both financially and symbolically—and not only to avoid a future debate over who lost Russia if all goes wrong.

The United States should long ago have had a policy coordinated with other industrial states. The Group of Seven discussion last year was a hasty effort. The group’s proposal this year for some \$24 billion in total assistance in all categories by all countries—mixing apples and oranges—was a political improvisation rather than the product of detailed study, but since it is international public policy it deserves to go forward rather than to stagnate.

American involvement in the internal affairs of other countries raises both moral and pragmatic questions. The United States has a dubious record when its intervention abroad goes beyond Marshall Plan, Agency for International Development (AID), or Peace Corps assistance. Recent experience in Vietnam, Panama, Iraq, and Nicaragua scarcely lessens concern about the United States becoming a fount of policy advice based on sorely inadequate knowledge or empathy—advice that recipients in the former Soviet Union can, nonetheless, scarcely afford to refuse. It is important, both for the United States and for them, to set a clear limit beyond which America will not intervene or dictate.

Those limits are particularly important in the political field. There has been some enthusiasm lately about spreading democracy worldwide, and the proposition that the United States should take on this mission has been forcefully and subtly argued.¹ It would indeed be

a beautiful and noble task. But the obstacles are no less glaring—both at home, in securing the continued support that such a protracted effort would require, and abroad, for it is not at all certain the United States knows how precisely to “promote democracy.” The endeavor would be a formidable one in Russia and Ukraine alone, and it is a forbidding prospect in those new states that have never known anything approximating democracy and which lack what are commonly considered the prerequisites for it.

This is by no means an argument against helping groups and individuals, parties and publications that are democratic in their convictions and programs (though some, no doubt, are faking). Given sufficient time, massive exchanges of young people (as proposed by the Bradley-Leach amendment, for instance) can make a significant difference. But to proclaim the triumph of political democracy in backward corners of the post-Soviet space as a goal of United States foreign policy is to invite ridicule and a waste of resources. To insist that Russia, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan, or Armenia needs a two-party system, primaries, and other attributes of American political life is to miss both the Eurasian forest and its trees.

International stability, by contrast, is both a legitimate and a realistic objective that is in the interests of the United States and of the international community. Under this heading, the withdrawal of CIS armed forces (and their repositioning or demobilization), the conversion of defense enterprises to civilian production, and support of or participation in international peacekeeping, mediation, and fact-finding operations are not only entirely proper activities but deserve vigorous and creative American support.

While lacking a comprehensive formula in this area, the United States has appeared to welcome sponsorship by multilateral agencies such as the United Nations and the CSCE of these kinds of efforts in the post-Soviet space. At the same time, it seems reluctant to become directly involved in disputes in Moldova or Georgia, Armenia, or Azerbaijan. A more affirmative American policy is needed, especially as the international community inches toward a redefinition of the boundaries of state sovereignty that recognizes far more readily the legitimacy of international concern—and if need be, action—when elementary rights are violated within individual nations, whether they be in South Africa, Bosnia and Herzegovina, or Cambodia.

The Soviet successor states present the United States with an unexpected challenge and the opportunity for innovative policies. Even if some efforts go wrong, the United States must not give up. Yet, it is essential not to try the impossible. In the end, it will be wisest to help the new countries find their own way, but it is important for the United States to do its utmost to improve the conditions under which they do it. ■

¹See, for example, Larry Diamond, “Promoting Democracy,” *Foreign Policy*, no. 87 (Summer 1992), pp. 25–46, and Graham T. Allison Jr., and Robert P. Beschel Jr., “Can the United States Promote Democracy?” *Political Science Quarterly*, vol. 107, no. 1 (Spring 1992), pp. 81–98.

One of the defining—and most debated—issues of the cold war was the Soviet military threat. That threat “has evaporated, and it will be extraordinarily difficult for the post-Soviet armies to present a remotely comparable danger.”

The Armies of the Post-Soviet States

BY MARK KRAMER

One of the many oddities of life in the first days of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was the lingering presence of a military establishment whose chief mission had been to defend a regime and a country that no longer existed. As recently as the late 1980s, the Soviet military was a formidable institution. With some 5 million soldiers, it maintained a highly visible and intimidating presence in Europe, East Asia, and distant portions of the third world. Its alliance with six Eastern European countries in the Warsaw Pact not only provided a defensive “buffer zone” against the West, but also facilitated elaborate Soviet military plans for combined nuclear and conventional attacks against NATO. As backward as the Soviet Union may have been in most respects, the country had sufficient military strength to warrant being called a global “superpower.”

That status was abruptly lost, however, when first the Warsaw Pact collapsed and then the whole Soviet state disintegrated, giving way to 15 independent republics. The United States was left as the world’s only superpower. And yet, even after the Soviet Union was dissolved, the Soviet military and the vast military-industrial complex that supported it remained in place, albeit at a somewhat reduced level.

The failure of the CIS to develop into a viable institution raised further complications for the ex-Soviet armed forces. Despite initial attempts by the Russian government to preserve a joint military structure under the Commonwealth’s auspices, the former republics moved swiftly to create their own armies. This trend soon compelled Russia to set up its own national armed forces, leaving the CIS with virtually no military or any other functions. The decline of the Commonwealth, in turn, has expanded Russia’s direct control over many key aspects of post-Soviet military policy.

THE RISE OF INDEPENDENT FORCES

From the time the CIS was founded in December 1991, the 11 member-states (Georgia and the Baltic states did not join) agreed on only one important military issue: namely, that all nuclear and “strategic” forces should remain under unified central command. Matters pertaining to nonnuclear forces, and even some issues connected with nuclear weapons, were subject to dispute. Equally contentious were attempts to fund the central defense budget.

The difficulty in resolving the status of the former Soviet armed forces stemmed from a fundamental tension between the two preponderant members of the Commonwealth—Russia and Ukraine—over what the CIS should be. Ukrainian leaders considered the Commonwealth a purely transitional organization whose chief purpose was to dispose of the former Soviet nuclear arsenal. Officials in Kiev often intimated that Ukraine would withdraw from the CIS as soon as the last of the Ukrainian-based nuclear weapons were eliminated. Russian leaders, however, hoped to make the Commonwealth a permanent (and ideally, Moscow-dominated) coordinating body that would oversee key economic, military, and political affairs. These divergent conceptions of the proper role for the CIS lay behind most of the specific disagreements about the former Soviet army.

In the first few months of this year, the difference between the Russian and Ukrainian approaches was particularly evident on the question of forming separate national armed forces. As early as July 1990, when the Ukrainian parliament adopted a declaration of “sovereignty,” Ukrainian leaders had insisted on the right to deploy an independent army as part of a larger drive to establish and maintain Ukraine’s political independence. Even before Ukraine formally regained its independence in late 1991, Ukrainian President Leonid Kravchuk had created a defense ministry under the leadership of General Konstantin Morozov, who promptly began organizing a full-fledged national army.

In line with this effort, Kravchuk soon asserted Ukrainian jurisdiction over all nonnuclear forces based in Ukraine, and also laid claim to the Black Sea Fleet,

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based at Sevastopol on the Crimean peninsula. In both cases Russia strongly objected to Ukraine's attempts to gain control. Equally controversial was Kravchuk's directive that all troops based on Ukrainian territory and sailors deployed with the Black Sea Fleet swear an oath of loyalty to Ukraine. Hundreds of thousands agreed to take the oath, but the requirement aroused vehement protests from Russian leaders and from some CIS military officers of Russian descent.

In contrast to Ukraine's determination to form an independent military force, Russian President Boris Yeltsin tried for several months to avoid creating a separate Russian army. Instead, he sought to preserve the centralized command network and "common military-strategic space" of the CIS, and to head off attempts by other republics to set up their own armed forces. Yeltsin and his aides knew that any announcement about the establishment of a Russian army, even one nominally under CIS joint command, would undermine the Commonwealth's military viability.

Initially, Yeltsin's desire to consolidate military forces under the CIS was widely shared within the Russian government, not least because Russian officials hoped the existence of the joint military command would thwart Ukraine's bid to set up an independent army. But as a Ukrainian army quickly became a reality, Russian leaders had to look anew at the option of forming their own military. This prospect gained greater urgency when Azerbaijan and Moldova followed Ukraine's lead in pressing ahead with independent armies and in eschewing most CIS joint military activities. Other former republics, such as Belarus and Uzbekistan, indicated that they also intended to create armed forces, though they were more willing than Ukraine to continue participating in the CIS command structure, at least temporarily.

Pressure to form a separate Russian army also increased when successive meetings of the CIS heads of state in late 1991 and early 1992 failed to produce agreement on important military issues, including an acceptable command structure for "nonstrategic" weapons and a proper definition of "strategic" forces. The Russian government wanted as expansive a definition as possible, while Ukrainian leaders insisted that strategic forces be limited only to nuclear weapons and some aerospace defenses. The CIS leaders were also at odds over funding for Commonwealth military activities. Although they had agreed to share the financing of the CIS defense budget, most governments reneged on this commitment, and Russia effectively ended up providing all the funds.

The movement toward a separate Russian army was also spurred by political infighting and disputes within

the Russian government. On many issues, Yeltsin and his aides encountered criticism and outright opposition from more hard-line officials, particularly the vice president, Aleksandr Rutskoi, and the chairman of the Russian parliament, Ruslan Khasbulatov. By early 1992, both Rutskoi and Khasbulatov were publicly urging reconsideration of the question of the establishment of a Russian army. Although both men claimed to prefer "retaining the unity of the armed forces," they left no doubt that Russia should be prepared to organize its own military establishment.

The mounting problems CIS units encountered in areas of ethnic conflict were an additional factor contributing to the Russian government's shift in favor of deploying a separate army. In Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Moldova, soldiers under nominal CIS command were being drawn into local ethnic fighting, often without a clear idea of their objectives. The CIS machinery proved inadequate to cope with these security demands, and Russian leaders such as Rutskoi began calling for ethnic Russian soldiers to be pulled out of "areas where it no longer makes sense to keep them." Their calls became more strident and frequent as hostilities escalated in the different non-Slavic regions, especially after 10 CIS officers were taken hostage for four days this March by Armenian forces in the Armenian town of Artik, near the Turkish border.

These developments led Yeltsin in mid-March to issue an eight-part decree setting out preliminary steps for the establishment of a Russian ministry of defense and a Russian army. The decree marked the informal death-knell of the CIS military establishment. The formal end came two months later, when Yeltsin issued another decree implementing his earlier directive.¹ Shortly thereafter, nine of the eleven CIS defense ministers who had assembled in Moscow (the Azerbaijani and Moldovan ministers did not attend) agreed that the CIS armed forces should be virtually abolished. The ministers declared that units under CIS Commander-in-Chief Evgenii Shaposhnikov "should be reduced to a minimum," comprising only nuclear weapons. All other forces that had previously been regarded as "strategic," including the Black Sea Fleet, were removed from CIS command. With that, the military functions of the CIS effectively ceased.

Since then, the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific Ocean Fleets of the Soviet navy have become part of the new Russian navy, and the Black Sea Fleet, which has been the subject of protracted negotiations between Russia and Ukraine (as well as Georgia), will be under joint Russian-Ukrainian control until 1995. Ground and air forces once considered "strategic" have now become part of the Russian army or, in some cases, have been transferred to the army of the state on whose territory they were deployed.

Even CIS control over nuclear forces seems likely to be phased out as the Russian government assumes ever

¹"Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii: O sozdanii Vooruzhenykh Sil Rossiiskoi Federatsii," *Rossiiskaya gazeta*, May 9, 1992, p. 1.

greater supervision of the entire nuclear arsenal. All tactical nuclear weapons were transferred to Russia by May of this year, and are to be eliminated by the mid-1990s in accordance with a pledge made by Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and reaffirmed by Yeltsin. Although Russian officials said at midyear they would leave strategic nuclear forces under CIS command, this arrangement is little more than a fig leaf for the Russian president's ultimate control. When all remaining long-range nuclear missiles in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan are eliminated by 1994 (or shortly thereafter), Russia will be the only former Soviet republic with nuclear weapons. At that point the Russian government is bound to establish *de jure* as well as *de facto* control over the nuclear arsenal.

A RUSSIAN ARMY EMERGES

The reduction of the CIS's military functions has been accompanied by a brisk expansion of Russian plans to set up an independent army. Yeltsin's decree in May left the president himself interim defense minister, but he soon relinquished that post and appointed General Pavel Grachev, the former commander of Soviet airborne forces, for the job. Grachev had earned wide respect for his defiance of the August 1991 coup attempt, but his selection as defense minister disappointed those who had been hoping Yeltsin would designate a civilian for the top post.

Other appointments to senior command posts have been more controversial. The designation of General Viktor Dubynin as chief of the Russian General Staff was one of many cases in which a hard-line officer from the Soviet military was given a leading position in the Russian armed forces. By contrast, younger officers supporting radical military reform were excluded from the top ranks. Most surprising of all was the appointment in late June of General Boris Gromov, the former commander of Soviet forces in Afghanistan, as a deputy defense minister. Rumors of Gromov's complicity in the August coup, it was thought, had removed him from consideration for any high-ranking position in the post-Soviet armies.

As soon as Grachev and his deputies took office, they embarked on the formation of the new ministry, general staff, and other administrative organs. All of these were based on the corresponding institutions in the Soviet (and then CIS) armed forces. In effect, what remained of the Soviet army was transformed into a new Russian army.

As part of this process, Russian military officials reaffirmed that all troops and weapons located outside the boundaries of the former Soviet Union (mainly in Germany, Poland, Mongolia, and Cuba), as well as all forces that until this spring had been under CIS joint

command (primarily in the Baltics, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia), would become an integral part of the Russian army. Most of these forces will be withdrawn gradually onto Russian territory, but some Russian units—mainly those in Central Asia—will remain permanently deployed outside Russia. The status of all such "Groups of Forces" abroad will have to be arranged through bilateral negotiations.

The core of the new Russian army will be the elite divisions of the Western Group of Forces, which are now being withdrawn from eastern Germany. Roughly 175,000 troops had returned to Russia from Germany by midyear, leaving nearly 220,000 still to be pulled out. Traditionally, these were the best-trained and most combat-ready units in the Soviet armed forces, and Russian leaders hope these traits will carry over into the Russian army.

Like the Soviet military, Russia's armed forces have separate ground, missile, air defense, air, and naval forces. The ground forces, however, are being shifted from their old army-division command system to a unified corps-brigade set-up, as was done in Hungary in the mid-1980s. This new structure should permit the more efficient use of personnel and weaponry. Grachev also plans to form mobile forces, similar to the American rapid deployment force, which will "include airborne assault formations, military transport, ground forces aviation, and mobile logistical support from all branches of the services."²

The troop strength of the Russian army is around 3 million, but a reduction to 2.1 million is planned by 1995. A further cut to 1.5 million is scheduled to occur by 2000, though it was originally slated for the end of 1994. The projected cuts have been greatly slowed down because of concerns about unemployment and a shortage of housing, both of which are likely to intensify as hundreds of thousands of troops return from abroad. Indeed, one of the reasons Russia has not pulled its Northwest Group of Forces out of the Baltic states is that the soldiers have nowhere to go. The long delay in the withdrawal has caused anger and resentment in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia, but they are too weak to force out the Russians.

Drastic shortfalls in conscription, however, are likely to generate pressure to return to a faster pace of reductions in the officers corps, lest the Russian army become even more top-heavy with officers than the Soviet army used to be. The CIS call-ups for the spring of 1992 encountered widespread evasion and resistance, and only 25 to 30 percent of the quota in most regions was eventually met. Because roughly 60 percent of the Russian army (like the Soviet army before it) is composed of conscripts, the CIS draft caused widespread shortages of personnel.

Future rounds of conscription geared specifically to the Russian army may not be quite as widely defied, especially if unemployment in Russia increases as a

²"Stroitel'stvo rossiiskoi armii—obshchenarodnaya zadacha," *Krasnaya zvezda*, May 26, 1992, p. 1.

result of Yeltsin's free-market economic reform program. Nevertheless, the problem of drafting new soldiers is serious enough that the Russian army plans to adopt a mixed (volunteer and conscript) personnel system no later than the end of 1993. The new system will offer incentives for reenlistment, and will for the first time include provisions for alternative service. Whether this arrangement will be either economically or politically feasible remains to be seen.

THE ARMY'S NEW MISSION

Even if the Russian army is cut back to 1.5 million soldiers, it will still be the largest force in Europe, and one of the largest in the world. It will also be much larger than the combined armies of all the other former Soviet republics. The Ukrainian army will number about 220,000 troops by the end of the century (down from its current size of 700,000), and the armies of Belarus and Kazakhstan will consist of roughly 90,000 and 45,000 soldiers respectively. No other former republic will have a standing army of more than 25,000 soldiers (and most will be a good deal smaller).

Futhermore, the Russian army's weaponry and equipment should be vastly superior to those of the other post-Soviet armies. The Soviet Union's military plants were disproportionately concentrated in Russia, with as much as 85 percent of the total located there. (Most of the remaining factories were in Ukraine, and virtually all the rest were in Belarus or Kazakhstan.) In some sectors, such as military aviation, even larger proportions of manufacturing capacity were located in Russia, and for some weapons (including nuclear warheads), all relevant factories were located in Russia. The breakup of the union has left Russia with a military-industrial base that dwarfs comparable facilities in the other former republics. Moreover, Russian defense plants are generally self-sufficient, whereas most in the other states depend on Russian factories for components and spare parts.

The Russian government's plan to convert military industry to civilian production, if successfully implemented, will clearly limit the types and quality of weaponry the Russian army can expect in the future. So far conversion has made almost no headway, and the Russian government has allowed weapons factories to continue producing arms if they try to sell more of them abroad. In the longer term, however, the government's efforts to convert military industry and demilitarize the Russian economy could impose severe constraints on the army. A harbinger of what may lie ahead is the 85 percent reduction in weapons procurement that the Russian parliament approved earlier this year. In the future, enough defense research and production facilities will remain operating in Russia to equip a full-fledged Russian army (as well as to export weapons for hard currency), but Yeltsin's economic reforms, if successful, will significantly reduce the

country's military-industrial sector. Of course, if the economic reforms do not succeed and the Russian economy continues to deteriorate, the situation is likely to prove even bleaker for the army.

Economic constraints aside, the government's assessment of potential external threats will help determine the size of the Russian military. To deter incursions by outside powers, Russian leaders will undoubtedly want to deploy forces sufficient to deal with two or more large-scale threats simultaneously at either end of the country. The extensive air defense network that Russia inherited from the Soviet army will be invaluable for this, although serious gaps in coverage have been created by the loss of facilities in the Baltics, Ukraine, and Azerbaijan. Just as important will be the "mobile forces" that Grachev proposes for rapid deployment around the country.

Far more controversial will be the use of the Russian army for internal purposes. The experience with CIS units in Azerbaijan, Armenia, and Georgia, and the Russian government's own brief (and abortive) attempt to use force in Chechen-Ingushetia in late 1991, confirmed the general belief that most armies are not well-suited for domestic policing on a large scale.

The dangers of army involvement in intra-CIS upheavals have become all too apparent in Moldova, where troops have joined in the bloody fighting in the Trans-Dniestrian region between Moldovan security forces and secessionist ethnic Russians. To keep the army's role in check, Yeltsin issued a decree in early April transferring jurisdiction over the Fourteenth Army (based in Moldova) from the CIS to Russia. Despite this change the fighting merely escalated and led to a virtual state of war between Russia and Moldova.

To make matters worse, Russia's own problems with the independence-minded Chechen government, and the even more serious threat of secession in Tatarstan, are unlikely to go away. Although Russian leaders have indicated they will do all they can to prevent the autonomous republics from seceding, the Chechen and Tatar governments have been insistent on achieving outright independence. Both governments refused to sign the federation agreement that Yeltsin sponsored with the other autonomous republics in late March, and the Russian government may eventually come under intense pressure to send in troops.

If attempts to hold the Russian Federation together prove futile and the Russian army has to intervene in several places for a prolonged period, the entire military could fragment along political or ethnic lines. For that reason if for no other, Russian leaders will be extremely wary of using the army to maintain domestic order. Instead, they will probably work to establish a strong internal security network that includes riot police and peacekeeping units.

COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND PEACEKEEPING

Most of the military-related documents that the CIS states have concluded since late 1991 have been of no practical importance. One of the few exceptions is the Treaty on Collective Security signed in Tashkent in May 1992 by Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.³ In addition, Belarus and Turkmenistan indicated that they might eventually sign as well. (Turkmenistan did, in effect, join the collective security arrangement in midyear when it agreed to form a small army under direct Russian command.)

This treaty is noteworthy because it is the first agreement that specifically commits a group of former Soviet republics to undertake cooperative military action. But ironically, the commitments set out by the treaty are based on the assumption that the signatories will field their own armies. Thus, the treaty reinforced the trend toward independent national armies and effectively undermined any lingering rationale for joint forces under the CIS.

The provisions on mutual security in the treaty are similar to those in the NATO charter and the charter of the defunct Warsaw Pact. Under Article 4 of the new treaty, "an act of aggression committed. . . against any of the participating states will be regarded as aggression against every participating state." States that come under attack will receive "all necessary assistance, including military assistance," from other signatories.

Characteristically, Ukraine refused to have anything to do with the treaty; and its leaders reaffirmed their intention to remain outside all post-Soviet military alliances and blocs. Moldova also declined to sign, apparently to prevent the treaty from being applied directly to the escalating Trans-Dniestrian conflict (though Russian troops in Moldova have been involved through other means). Azerbaijan, too, spurned the collective security agreement and sought instead to withdraw from the CIS because of Russia's alleged tilt toward Armenia.

The two states other than Russia that have been the most eager to retain close military ties, Kazakhstan and Armenia, were enthusiastic supporters of the collective security treaty. Kazakhstan's president, Nursultan Nazarbayev, followed up on the treaty by establishing a "defense alliance" with Russia, including joint operation of key space facilities at Tyuratam and Sary-Shagan. Nazarbayev had been dismayed by the breakdown of the CIS military framework, and it was with great reluctance that he proposed the formation of a "national guard" and ministry of defense for Kazakhstan in May, after the Russian army began taking shape. The new treaty helped make up for the decline of the CIS.

The collective security arrangements with Russia are of even greater importance for Armenia than for Kazakhstan, especially if Armenian officials seek to invoke Article 4 in their ongoing war with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. Russian leaders have tried to avert this possibility by indicating that the agreement covers acts of aggression only at the "external borders" of the Commonwealth (that is, the old borders of the Soviet Union). However, there is nothing in the agreement that warrants such an interpretation, and a future Russian government might change its policy. The collective security treaty could thus end up giving Russia a direct role in the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan.

The decision by virtually all the Central Asian states to embrace a mutual security pact with Russia apparently grew out of concerns raised by the demise of the pro-Soviet regime in Afghanistan. After Afghan President Najibullah's government collapsed in late April, leaders in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and other neighboring states feared that instability might spill into their own countries. The violent unrest that engulfed Tajikistan in May reinforced these anxieties. As a hedge against further instability, the Central Asian governments perceived a distinct advantage in formally aligning themselves with Russia.

The collective security treaty effectively codifies a new political-military relationship between Russia and the other signatories similar to that between the Soviet Union and the members of the Warsaw Pact. Russia will not have the same degree of influence over the other states' internal affairs that the Soviet Union used to exercise in Eastern Europe, but the collective security treaty (combined with bilateral "framework" agreements that Russia has been signing with the Central Asian countries) will enable the Russian government to wield substantial influence over the other states' military activities and alignments.

Indeed, Article 1 of the treaty forbids the signatories from "entering into military alliances, or participating in any group of states, or taking part in any actions directed against another participating state." This is precisely the kind of language Soviet officials kept trying to include in bilateral treaties with the Eastern European countries in 1990 and 1991. Except for Romania, the Eastern European governments firmly rejected such a clause because of concerns about the restraints it would impose on future actions. The resurfacing of this concept in the collective security treaty is indicative of the sort of agreement it is.

Despite its drawbacks, the collective security treaty has facilitated a broader agreement on peacekeeping that nine of the CIS member states adopted this July. The new peacekeeping forces, which consist of units assigned by individual former republics, are to monitor cease-fires in areas of ethnic conflict. The first test of the new forces came in Georgia's South Ossetia, where

³"Dogovor o kollektivnoi bezopasnosti," *Krasnaya zvezda*, May 23, 1992, p. 1.

peacekeepers were deployed as a buffer between warring parties, though with only partial success. Another test was projected for Moldova, where units were to be supplied by Romania and Bulgaria as well as by members of the CIS. This assignment ran into difficulty, however, after numerous cease-fires broke down and after General Aleksandr Lebed, the belligerent commander of Russia's Fourteenth Army, denounced the Moldovan government as "fascist."

The new peacekeeping forces were nominally placed under CIS command, but the main responsibility actually lay all along with Russia. Thus, the fate of intra-CIS peacekeeping arrangements in the future will depend on Russia's willingness to place its forces in harm's way and on the willingness of other states to accept Russian intervention.

AN IMPROVED ARMS CONTROL ENVIRONMENT

Once the cold war ended, far-reaching arms control agreements finally became practical. These agreements may not seem as important as they once did, but they will clearly have a major impact on the armies of the post-Soviet states.

The Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty, which was signed by the Soviet Union and 21 other countries in November 1990, sets limits on heavy weapons deployed in Europe, including main battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery, and military aircraft. Implementation was delayed in 1991 when disagreements arose about specific provisions. These were ultimately resolved, but the fate of the treaty was left in doubt when the Soviet state disintegrated. After several months of wrangling within the CIS, the treaty was finally given new life at the meeting in Tashkent in mid-May 1992, when representatives from eight former Soviet republics (whose territory was covered by CFE) adopted an "Agreement on Principles and Procedures for Implementing the CFE Treaty."⁴ This document was the basis for an agreement signed by the 32 members of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in June, which allocated weaponry among the former Soviet republics in line with cuts required

under CFE. The NACC agreement in turn paved the way for the treaty's ratification and formal implementation in July.

The CFE treaty will significantly alter the military forces of the post-Soviet states. The treaty does not limit troops, but it requires a nearly 30 percent reduction in the total number of heavy weapons deployed by the former Soviet republics. Some former republics, such as Georgia and Azerbaijan, will have to make drastic cuts of up to 75 percent overall. The nearly 2-to-1 advantage in heavy weapons that Azerbaijan currently enjoys over Armenia will be eliminated under CFE. Russia's quantitative superiority over Ukraine will be pared by more than 20 percent (although this does not include Russian weapons based east of the Urals). The treaty will thus eliminate some of the most glaring inequities in current force levels.

The Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which covers long-range nuclear missiles and heavy bombers, was signed by the Soviet Union and the United States in July 1991. Before it could be implemented the Soviet Union collapsed, and START was temporarily in limbo. At the time, Soviet heavy bombers and long-range nuclear missiles were based only in Russia and three other republics—Kazakhstan, Ukraine, and Belarus—but even this limited dispersal of weapons was enough to cause problems when the republics became fully independent. Belarus quickly indicated that it would transfer its missiles to Russian territory, where they would be eliminated under START, but uncertainty prevailed in the early months of 1992 about the willingness of Ukraine and Kazakhstan to do the same.

Finally, in late May both states, as well as Belarus, Russia, and the United States, signed a protocol to START requiring the elimination of all former Soviet missile launchers based outside Russia within seven years (and presumably earlier, by 1994). The protocol treated the three non-Russian states as full parties to START alongside the United States and Russia; but it also stipulated that they must join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty as nonnuclear-weapons states "within the shortest possible time." This arrangement ensured that START could be enforced as originally signed, bringing cuts of a few thousand deployed nuclear warheads on both sides.⁵

As significant as the reductions under START may have seemed, they were overshadowed by a "joint understanding" that the United States and Russia signed this June. The agreement set forth targets for much larger reductions of strategic arms to be carried out in two stages by the early twenty-first century. Under the agreement, both sides would be left with between 3,000 and 3,500 deployed warheads, and all Russian SS-18 "heavy" missiles would be eliminated.⁶ If these targets are met, the American and Russian

⁴"Voennye obyazatel'stva byvshego Soyuza pered Evropoi Rossiya vpolnyaet," *Krasnaya zvezda*, July 10, 1992, p. 1. The three Baltic states were not required to sign the agreement because all heavy weapons on their territory are being transferred to Russia.

⁵The treaty requires only that launchers be dismantled; it does not require that warheads or most missiles be destroyed. Ukraine and Kazakhstan have expressed interest in using decommissioned missiles for commercial space launches.

⁶Again, this statement did not require the actual elimination of any warheads or most missiles; only launchers would be destroyed. Moreover, the "counting rules" to determine how many warheads are on a particular missile are generous enough to allow each side to retain a substantially larger force than is generally realized.

nuclear arsenals will be reduced to about one-quarter their current size.

The reductions envisaged under CFE, START, and the June 1992 agreement will be complicated and expensive for Russia and the other states to carry out. The extensive monitoring and verification required will increase costs. Other agreements that may soon follow, such as a second CFE accord limiting troops, a ban on chemical weapons, and an agreement to dismantle nuclear warheads, will lead to even greater expense. In light of the economic hardships plaguing the former Soviet republics, arms control may be reaching the limits of what the post-Soviet governments can afford. It is no small irony that after the Soviet authorities allocated so much money to a buildup of military forces, the post-Soviet governments will have to expend considerable resources to undo that buildup.

CONSTRAINTS ON MILITARY SPENDING

The Soviet economy's accelerated deterioration last year, and the continued economic decline in all the former republics this year, led to much steeper reductions in military spending than had been initially planned. The Soviet military budget reached a peak in 1988, but over the next two years it declined by some 12 percent.⁷ A further reduction of 5 percent was planned for 1991, but the chaotic state of the economy brought about a contraction of between 15 and 20 percent instead. The spending cuts took a particularly heavy toll on weapons procurement, research and development, and operations and maintenance. Many Soviet weapons programs were sharply reduced and some were halted; moreover, troops in the field suddenly found themselves without adequate fuel, support equipment, and food. Training of ground and air forces was sharply cut back, and deployments of naval units were curtailed.

The economic problems that gave rise to these unplanned reductions did not abate once the Soviet Union collapsed. On the contrary, the economic plight of Russia and the other states has grown steadily worse despite the ambitious reform program Yeltsin's government has undertaken, and no end is in sight.

Consequently, the resources that can be devoted to military spending over the next several years will be severely limited. Yeltsin has sought to maintain the loyalty of senior military officers by offering pay hikes and increased benefits, and he has also pledged to improve the living conditions of ordinary soldiers. The expenses these steps have entailed will increase still

further if the Russian army adopts a mixed personnel system. This means even less money will be available for weapons production, research, and training.

Some constraints on the defense budget could be eased if Russian and Ukrainian military factories exported more weapons for hard currency. Russian leaders have made a determined effort to ship more arms abroad, and some officials in Moscow have talked about earning as much as \$30 billion a year from foreign arms sales. In practice, however, the campaign to export more weapons has been a striking failure. Arms deliveries from the Soviet Union reached a peak of \$25 billion in 1986 and fell precipitously thereafter, reflecting a downturn in the global arms market. In 1991 weapons exports fell 55 percent, earning only \$5 billion. Moreover, the conditions that have brought about the contraction of worldwide arms purchases are unlikely to dissipate soon. A recent study by NATO earlier this year predicted that Russia and the other former republics will find it difficult just to maintain their arms transfers at 1991 levels.⁸

Thus, the post-Soviet states will face tough decisions. The intensive militarization of the Russian and Ukrainian economies under Soviet rule means the two countries cannot simply dismantle their arms industries overnight, creating mass unemployment in the process. Yet the longer they hold back in converting—or, better yet, closing—their weapons factories, the more difficult the task of long-term economic restructuring will be. Given the magnitude of the economic problems that the post-Soviet states confront, they have little alternative but to proceed with drastic military spending cuts.

A DIMINISHED THREAT

Despite Russia's military preeminence in Europe, what has come undone over the past three years cannot be put back together. The demise of the Warsaw Pact, the dissolution of the Soviet state, the arms control agreements of the post-cold war era, and the difficulties bedeviling the Russian economy ensure that the Russian army will be a mere shadow of the old Soviet army. This is not to say Russia will never again pose a serious danger to its neighbors or even to more distant countries. The Russian government's domineering posture toward the Baltic states over the past year illustrates the sort of problem that could arise in more virulent form elsewhere, especially if a hard-line, militaristic regime comes to power in Moscow. Even after the projected reductions under START are carried out, Russia will retain sufficient nuclear forces to destroy any potential enemy, including the United States. Nevertheless, the global threat of military expansion that the Soviet army posed for so many years has evaporated, and it will be extraordinarily difficult for the post-Soviet armies to present a remotely comparable danger. ■

⁷Data on military spending are from US Central Intelligence Agency, "Moscow's Defense Spending Cuts Accelerate" (Langley, Va., May 1992).

⁸North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Economic Committee, *Soviet Economic Performance in 1991: A Weak Foundation for a New Political Beginning* (Brussels, January 1992).

The redrawing of the map of the Soviet Union has focused attention on the five former Soviet republics that make up Central Asia. A region once considered the esoteric domain of Soviet ethnic specialists, it has become one of the most closely watched areas in the world because of its Muslim population and its strategic proximity to the Middle East and South Asia.

Central Asia's Emergence

BY GEORGE I. MIRSKY

Central Asia, one of the world's oldest inhabited areas and home to an ancient and highly developed civilization, was until last year viewed by most as a faraway, godforsaken place of no serious interest to anyone.¹ The end of the Soviet Union last year has changed that. The region has been neither the quietest nor the most restive of the former Soviet territories. What about tomorrow?

A NEGLECTED AREA

Some years ago this writer had the opportunity to visit Central Asia as a member of a team headed by Yegor Gaidar, currently Russia's economic czar. The picture we were presented with was truly appalling. The region's chief gynecologist, for instance, told us that the vast majority of pregnant women had already borne one or more children and were aware that there were health risks if they had another child. However, they had become pregnant because contraception was either unavailable or was rejected as contrary to custom and religion. (Most women in the region had never even visited a gynecologist.)

In the tobacco-growing valleys of Tajikistan, nicotine could be found in infants' blood. In the area near the Aral Sea, doctors counseled would-be mothers not to nurse their infants, since their breast milk could be contaminated. The Aral Sea itself is a scene of immense ecological damage. The two main rivers that feed this

inland sea are primary irrigation sources for the large cotton plantations that dominate Central Asia's economy. Because of the intensive irrigation required to cultivate cotton in the region, the Aral has lost 65 percent of its volume in the last 30 years. Irrigation has led to the salinization of huge tracts of arable land, and the area has been severely polluted by the huge quantities of chemical and mineral fertilizers used to grow cotton.

On cotton plantations, mainly women and children could be seen working, this kind of labor being deemed unfit for men. At the same time, in the *mahallas*—communal neighborhoods—large crowds of young men and teen-age boys idly stood around. (We were told that urban unemployment was assuming extremely dangerous proportions.)

Comparisons to the developing world are unavoidable. And this is just what Central Asia has been—the Soviet third world, backward and exploited, lagging behind the industrial center in economic and social development. Traditional patterns of belief, life-styles, behavior, and attitudes toward work successfully resisted Soviet-style modernization. In fact, it is totally incorrect to consider Central Asian societies as Sovietized by Communist rule and the Central Asian peoples no more than “Soviet” people speaking Oriental languages. Another kind of society managed to preserve its identity, although not quite intact.

Resistance was only one side of this unique relationship, the other side being coexistence. Communist rule was superimposed on traditional social structures that were sometimes called feudal (though there never has been true feudalism in Central Asia). Communism and traditional society proved to be quite compatible, since both have an authoritarian base. Central Asian scholar Boris Rumer maintains that clan and tribal consciousness “not only survived but [became] even stronger in the Soviet era. . . . A majority of the national cadres remain[ed] loyal to their clan and tribe.”²

Central Asia's client-patron relationships main-

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¹The five sovereign states that have emerged in Central Asia are: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan, strictly speaking, does not belong to Central Asia; it claims to be a Euroasian state that is a bridge between East and West.

²Boris Z. Rumer, *Soviet Central Asia: A Tragic Experiment* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1989), p. 148.

tained from generation to generation and its clan and communal group mentality fit easily into a Soviet system built on the absolute rule of omnipotent party first secretaries. In every locality there was only one official worth talking to, one man who decided everything—the party first secretary. In Central Asia the first secretary also symbolized and took the place of the traditional clan and ethnic leader; he was the local chieftain and all-powerful patron, a Godfather figure lording it over an entrenched network that often resembled the corporative structures of the Mafia. Loyalty to him was paramount, and hardly related to Communist ideology.

The native nomenklatura played a dual role: first, party and state officials were Communist apparatchiks just like their colleagues in Moscow, Leningrad, or Kiev; and second, they were traditional local bosses and patrons. Thus their system of rule was vertical, and they always had the valuable feedback from the grass roots, allowing them to gauge the mood of the populace. This is why they, unlike their counterparts in Russia, have retained their positions after the collapse of the Soviet system.

These elites held sway over a society that was (except in Kazakhstan) predominantly Muslim. Of course, within atheistic Soviet ideology, Islam was, if not banned, at least not encouraged. But people knew they were Muslims, and observed religious practices such as those concerning circumcision, marriage, and funeral rituals. They had a rudimentary knowledge of the basic tenets of Islam, and had heard about the Prophet Mohammed, Mecca, and pilgrimage; some performed their prayers and respected the region's few mosques and mullahs.

With independence came an inevitable religious revival. Overnight, Islam became a common denominator, a powerful vehicle (alongside ethnicity) for asserting identity. People instinctively felt it was Islam—which is not just a set of religious beliefs but a way of life and a civilization—that made them different from the Russians, whose rule they had never accepted as legitimate. Now openly proclaiming themselves Muslims (whether from the predominant Sunni sect or from smaller ones, like the Ismailite sect in Tajikistan) and asserting their Islamic identity, they have found at last what makes them a community distinct from all the others. For the Central Asians, Islam now embodies the ideas of nationalism and sovereignty; it is a banner of liberation.

The revival of Islam in Central Asia is probably unprecedented. Five years ago there were only about 260 mosques across the region; now there are more

than 5,000. Ten new mosques open each day. But the Islamic revival has, if not to compete with, then to coexist and somehow come to terms with another powerful trend accompanying the process of liberation and the assertion of identity: the rise of ethnicism.

ETHNOS AND NATION

Before the October Revolution, ethnicity was not a reference point for Central Asian communities, which historically were divided not along ethnolinguistic lines but by whether they were sedentary or pastoralist. Bukhara in Uzbekistan and Khojent in Tajikistan, two of the most populous and wealthy cities in Central Asian history, both have mixed ethnic populations. Those living in present-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan (especially urban dwellers), were largely bilingual, speaking local variants of Persian (Farsi) along with native Turkic dialects. All considered themselves "local Muslims." And from the point of view of the government, "religion formed the basis for distinguishing natives from infidels. . . . [T]he term 'nationality' in its modern meaning did not exist in this period."³

The Soviet regime, having discarded religion as an identity factor, made the national-linguistic the cornerstone of its neo-imperial policy. New political units were created based on nationality, which was rigidly linked to the issue of territory. The republics created in this manner were formed around a "core" nationality, which was the largest or the dominant ethnic group in an area. In some republics, nationhood was more artificial than others, but the process acquired a momentum of its own. For example, there had never been an Uzbek nation as such. An ethnic community largely descended from tribes related to the Mongols had come during the Middle Ages to what is now Uzbekistan and mixed with the sedentary population of the valleys. Under the Soviet regime, one of the most widespread local idioms was chosen as the official language, and the concept of a Uzbek nation was asserted. What followed was national self-assertion and self-identification in terms of the Uzbek nation. And Uzbek nationalism came into being alongside Turkmen and Tajik nationalism.

Since the borders of the republics were based on the predominance of a particular ethnic group within them, ethnic minorities were bound to exist in each. In specific localities, an ethnic minority could be in the overwhelming majority, and vice versa. Thus two famous ancient cities—Bukhara and Samarkand—with largely Tajik populations became part of Uzbekistan.

Generally speaking, in what used to be the Soviet Union, self-identification is now made on the basis of one's ethnonational community. Under the old regime, a broad multinational entity like the United States did not exist; there never was a Soviet nation. At

³Michael Mandelbaum, ed., *The Rise of Nations in the Soviet Union: American Foreign Policy and the Disintegration of the USSR* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1991), p. 19.

present a former Soviet citizen cannot identify with anything except an ethnic or religious community. State, party, class, profession—all have deteriorated to such an extent, everything appears so ugly and worthless that the only firm ground, the only basis for self-assertion and even pride, is found in membership in a stable, long-established community. Ethnos and religion, rather than the fragile and rapidly deteriorating political and economic dimensions of life, provide stability and command respect.

Interethnic relations in Central Asia are far from harmonious. Traditionally, there has been an ethnic hierarchy of sorts in the region. Tajiks consider themselves—and are—albeit grudgingly, considered by the others, except possibly the Uzbeks, to be the people with the oldest and richest culture. The Farsi-speaking Tajiks, who claim to be the inheritors of Persian civilization, are the largest non-Turkic Muslim community in Central Asia. Turkmens are considered by both Tajiks and Uzbeks to be seminomadic, and much less cultured. The Kazakhs and Kyrgyz are looked on by other Central Asians as gruff nomads only recently converted to Islam. Particularly bad are relations between Uzbeks and Kyrgyz; one need only recall the bloody massacres in the largely Uzbek city of Osh in Kyrgyzstan in 1990 in which people of both nations killed those from the other with incredible brutality. But the most dangerous conflict of the region may flare up between Uzbeks and Tajiks if the latter decide to raise the issue of Bukhara and Samarkand.

Islam Karimov, the president of Uzbekistan, maintains that the one thing that could possibly tear Central Asia apart is “the issue of frontiers—those artificial frontiers that were arbitrarily traced as early as 1924. . . . [I]f you want to pit one republic against another you have to start talking about frontiers.” It is true that the Bolsheviks imposed artificial—and in some cases blatantly unjust—frontiers, but it is certain that trying to revise these now would be opening up a Pandora’s box. Here a parallel with Africa would not be out of place: after independence African governments proved to be wise enough to reject any border claims and counterclaims, thus closing off a path to endless and bloody conflict between states.

But even if the present boundaries of the Central Asian countries remain unchanged, interethnic conflicts cannot be ruled out. And Uzbekistan is likely to be at the center of these conflicts, since the Uzbeks are the most powerful and dynamic people in the area. Uzbek assertiveness is a source of anxiety for neighboring states.

⁴Turan is the historic name of a Turkic empire that supposedly incorporated all Turkic-speaking peoples. The “Turan myth” has served to justify pan-Turkic schemes.

⁵Martha Brill Olcott, “Central Asia’s Post-Empire Politics,” *Orbis*, Spring 1992, p. 255.

Pan-Turkestan nationalists hope to bypass and override ethnic differences by advocating the creation of a larger entity in the form of a federation or confederation. There have been rumors of plans to build a united Turkestan or a Turan state.⁴ The idea appears unrealistic, if only because Tajikistan, with its Farsi-speaking majority, will almost certainly refuse to join a Turkic-dominated superstate. Most likely the present states will remain separate. However, even if the integrative movement achieves temporary success, it will probably disintegrate quickly, just as all attempts at Arab unification have failed.

THE STATE: ISLAMIC, SECULAR, DEMOCRATIC?

Many an observer believes that because ethnicity is a divisive rather than a unifying force, only religion can bring the Central Asian nations together. The newly formed Islamic political parties in the region tend to play down identification with ethnic groups and nationality, stressing the irrelevance of these. And the idea of creating an Islamic commonwealth is gaining ground in certain Muslim quarters that are anxious to put an end to ethnicity-based nationhood.

However, it may be too late. Ethnicity was given a tremendous boost by the Soviet regime: ethnic identity was enshrined as nationality and areas that had been bilingual and nonethnic were split up into separate nation-states. As a result, the situation in Central Asia is unique, since people look for and assert their identity in terms of both ethnicity and religion. Much will depend not only on the strength of Islamic feeling, but also on the outcome of the struggle for power now taking place in the new states. What forces will replace the old Soviet-created regimes now functioning under new colors?

In the words of Martha Brill Olcott, an American expert on Central Asia, “three main groups are . . . competing for political control everywhere in the region. Representatives of the old Central Asian ‘partocracy’—in most places split into competing groups—are struggling to remain in control. They are challenged by the new, so-called democratic groups dominated by intellectuals who generally played only a peripheral role under the old political order. The partocracy is also opposed by revivalist Islamic groups composed of fundamentalist-style clerics who were trained outside of the official establishment.”⁵

This analysis applies chiefly to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. It is in these two countries that Islamic and, to a lesser extent, democratic forces are the strongest opposition groups. In Uzbekistan’s Fergana Valley, Islamists have actually succeeded in establishing Islamic rule on a minor scale, introducing a ban on alcohol and requiring Islamic dress for women.

It is in the Fergana Valley too, as well as in Tajikistan, that the influence of the Islamic Renaissance party is strongest. This nonethnic movement

claims to represent all the Muslims of the former Soviet Union. (It was founded not by Central Asians but by the better-organized Russian-based Tatars and Dagestanis in 1990.) It is the closest thing yet to a genuine fundamentalist Islamic organization in the post-Soviet world.

Moderate Muslim-cum-nationalist parties trying to play two cards—Islam and ethnicity—simultaneously are *Birlik* (Unity) in Uzbekistan and *Rastakhez* (Renaissance) in Tajikistan. A democratic opposition made up largely of secular-oriented intellectuals is represented by *Erk* (Independence) in Uzbekistan and Democratic Movement in Tajikistan. The influence of these groups is limited, and they are unlikely to capture the masses since first, they are considered too “urban,” and second, their Islamic credentials are not very convincing. Here, *Birlik* and *Rastakhez* have an edge on the democrats. But it is precisely these nationalist-religious movements that represent the greatest threat to the ruling apparatchiks who may have changed their hats after the collapse of the union but desperately cling to power and oppose Islamization.

In the first presidential elections held after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Islam Karimov gained 86 percent of the popular vote in Uzbekistan while Rakhman Nabiyev in Tajikistan received 58 percent. The victory of these former first secretaries of the Communist party was unsurprising, since a large portion of the population regards them not so much as ex-Communist leaders as local bosses or clan chiefs. But while Karimov appears to be firmly in control in Tashkent, the same cannot be said of Nabiyev, who was almost overthrown during an insurrection in Tajikistan's capital, Dushanbe, earlier this year. However, this was not so much a confrontation between religious and secular forces as a traditional clan struggle. Nabiyev comes from the northern Khojent (formerly Leninabad) clan that has always wielded power in Tajikistan. The northerners were challenged by the southern clan, which in its turn is divided into two subclans: the Kulab region group (traditionally predominant in the southern alliance) and the Pamir group representing people of the Mountain-Badakhshan autonomous oblast, or province. The latter gained the upper hand as a result of the insurrection in Dushanbe, and both northern Khojentis and southern Kulabis felt betrayed.

Rumors of the north's secession and its incorporation into neighboring Uzbekistan began to circulate, and there was unrest in Kulab as well. A last-minute compromise was achieved that left Nabiyev president but with restricted powers. One important consequence was a clear gain in strength for the opposition *Rastakhez* movement; its leader, Davlat Usmon, was made deputy prime minister. Also worth noting is a significant upsurge in the influence of the Tajik spiritual leader (Qadikolon) Akbar Toradzhon Zoda, who

opposes an Islamic state on the grounds that the people are not yet ready for it. At present Tajikistan appears to be virtually ungovernable as a single state. Some areas—notably the south—are in open revolt and do not recognize central authority. Bloody clashes have already occurred.

Most observers believe that Nabiyev's days are numbered and the old Communist nomenklatura will have to exit. At the same time, there are many who hold that it is precisely the former Soviet apparatchiks with their experience and long-standing control over clan structures who can prevent chaos and anarchy or the seizure of power by Islamic fundamentalists. This is an agonizing dilemma for democrats, who just might prefer the devil they know to the one they do not, and opt for the old guard.

OUTSIDE FORCES

Any discussion of the future of Central Asia must include an assessment of the influence wielded by nearby Muslim states. It is possible to envisage at least a three-cornered struggle for influence in the area, with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan the principal players; eventually Saudi Arabia and Afghanistan are sure to join in.

Of the three, Turkey has the advantage of being the “motherland” of Turkism. It is also a relatively developed modern state that is secular and thus a counterweight to Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism. But it is precisely here that Turkey loses points against Iran when judged by the Muslim mainstream, to say nothing of the Islamic radicals. The secularism of Kemal Atatürk may appeal to a progressive-minded urban intelligentsia, but not to a destitute rural population and unemployed youth (almost 70 percent of the population in Central Asia is under age 25).

Iran has as yet little to offer except ideology and moral values that are by no means universally accepted in the area and are actively rejected by sophisticated urbanites. But Iran has a strong spiritual appeal traceable back to its late ruler, the Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini. Moreover, Iran has for centuries been honored in Central Asia as a cultural model even though most Central Asians, Tajiks included, are Sunni Muslims and not Shiites like the majority of Iranians.

On a trip to Teheran earlier this year, I asked an Iranian deputy foreign minister about possible rivalry between Turkey and Iran in Central Asia. The answer was, “What rivalry? Turks have nothing in the area but local idioms close to Turkish. History, civilization, culture, literature, science—everything is Iranian.” A high official at the same ministry gave his own definition of ethnicity: “a common destiny.” Iranians look on Central Asia as a natural sphere of cultural influence, playing down the ethnic issue and claiming to harbor no political ambitions. However, Iran can play an economic trump as well, with a vague promise to give the landlocked Central Asian states an outlet to

the Indian Ocean. This Turkey, which does not even share common borders with the states, cannot provide.

Karimov said that Uzbekistan had already opted for the Turkish model as "secular and civilized," rejecting the Iranian alternative. The United States is no doubt pleased with this and is doing its best to block Iran's penetration into Central Asia, using Turkey for the purpose. (Iran is quite sure this is the case.) The question of who will rule in Central Asia depends to a large degree on outside forces. But the reverse is also true: the rivalry between Iran and Turkey—which at present seems to be of a defensive character, each side trying mainly to block the other's advance—can be decisively influenced by the type of regime that replaces the present ruling elites in Central Asia.

WHAT LIES IN STORE FOR THE RUSSIANS?

The assertion of ethnic identity calls for a drive against "the others," the enemies. In Central Asia, Russians are likely to symbolize the forces of evil that have brought about all misfortunes. Russians have been leaving Uzbekistan and Tajikistan because of a perceived threat of a nationalist-religious flare-up leading to discrimination against "foreigners" and possibly even to pogroms. They are less nervous in Turkmenistan with its tough, autocratic, Communist-style regime. The picture is mixed in Kyrgyzstan, where a relatively liberal and progressive-minded statesman, President Askar Akaev, a man of the new post-Communist generation, is firmly in charge (but who knows for how long?). As to Kazakhstan, where Slavs actually outnumber the "core" population, Russians

are now more or less satisfied with the situation but uneasy about the future. President Nursultan Nazarbayev, a wise and astute politician, is constantly talking about "the people of Kazakhstan" rather than the "Kazakh people," stressing that in his republic individual rights have priority over those of ethnic communities. But "Islamic danger" here, too, is just around the corner.

Russians and Ukrainians make up the bulk of the modern labor force and the senior technicians and managers of Central Asia. Their exodus would jeopardize all economic reform; so the governments of the region need to calm the fears of the Russians who dominate urban areas and often hold key jobs. No less vital, however, is the maintenance of local nationalist morale, lest the present leadership lose out to Islamic-nationalist forces. The Islamic brand of nationalism may grow increasingly anti-Russian as the economic situation deteriorates and people become more and more frustrated. At that point a scapegoat is usually needed, and here is one right at hand.

The leaders of Central Asia seem to be aware of the political and economic disasters that could follow a break with Moscow and an anti-Russian campaign. Judging by their latest steps—a series of bilateral treaties with Russia—they have opted for alliance and cooperation with the single most powerful nation remaining after the breakup of the empire. This is a wise course. Nevertheless, it is hard to envisage for the region a smooth transition to genuinely independent and healthy states. ■

"It would be naive to think that even the wisest and most far-sighted [reform] policy... could have avoided trouble [in the Soviet Union]. Still, when the trouble came, it would not have had to be as far-reaching and seemingly intractable had Gorbachev [been] more sensitive to the problems of the multinational state emerging from autocracy and repression." In the end, "he [found] himself in the position of the sorcerer's apprentice: unable to stop the very forces he had evoked."

Looking at the Past: The Unraveling of the Soviet Union

BY ADAM B. ULAM

Were glasnost and perestroika merely the means through which Mikhail Gorbachev sought and hoped eventually to achieve personal dictatorship? Or, on the contrary, was he from the beginning a thoroughgoing liberal, intent on replacing Communist party rule with democracy, one whose earlier cautions and reservations were designed to reassure the more conservative of his followers? Or did he try to change his course only when he realized that the price of democracy might be the dissolution of the Soviet state?

The most reasonable hypothesis is that his original intentions were somewhere between those two extremes. Glasnost was not to be an end in itself but the means to clear the path to thorough reform of the state and society. Socialism would remain the foundation of the system. In politics the Communist party would remain supreme, but it would be internally democratized and would rule through persuasion rather than coercion. In the economy, overcentralization and the "command administrative" system would give way to "market socialism," the exact meaning of which was probably not clear to Gorbachev himself but stood for something that would allow for private initiative and foreign investments.

In the spring of 1988, Gorbachev, who was three years into his tenure as party general secretary, may well have felt that the debate about the party's sinful past had gone too far. But at the same time he undoubtedly must have expected that society's attention would now be turned to the ambitious plan of

constitutional and political reconstruction that he was about to propose. Glasnost had enabled him to discredit or immobilize the opponents of perestroika within the party councils. Now it was time to turn to the tasks at hand. It was only later, after the elections of 1989, that the proponents of reform realized how much damage historical debate had done to the spell—if that is the word—that the party had exercised over society. And after another year, and with the territorial integrity of the Soviet Union threatened, the general secretary would have appreciated what a famous American baseball player once said: "Don't look back. Something may be gaining on you."

But by mid-1988 Gorbachev stood at the height of his popularity at home and abroad. To the world he was the man who by creating an entirely new atmosphere in East-West relations had exorcised the specter of nuclear war. No one but the extreme doctrinaires begrudged him as yet the promise of perestroika and the new spirit of openness that pervaded the Soviet Union. The general secretary's assimilation of certain traits of Western political style, such as taking his wife along on his state visits abroad, must have created some head shaking among the party stalwarts, but by the same token it enhanced his popularity among the progressive elements of society. The same was true about his gradual dismantling of the apparatus and phraseology of proletarian internationalism. The people at large, if not the remaining ideologues and some generals, welcomed the government's pledge to withdraw Soviet troops from Afghanistan by February 1989 and thus conclude what had been an endless and unpopular war.

THE UNRAVELING BEGINS

Against this generally pleasing picture were portents of trouble. One touched on the possibility of remaking

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the party so that it would fit into the scheme of things to come. The other was a preview of what would be the Achilles' heel of perestroika in the Soviet Union: the nationalities question. What happened in the Caucasus in February 1988 foreshadowed the unraveling of the pattern of authority that for seven decades had held the multinational state together.

The ethnic mosaic that is the Caucasus had been the scene of national and religious hostilities since time immemorial. That "prison house of nationalities," as Lenin called czarist Russia, could not for all of its authoritarian character eradicate the most recurrent of these conflicts between the Muslim Tatars, or as they would be classified in Soviet times, Azerbaijanis, and the Christian Armenians. Racial, religious, and socioeconomic factors had all fueled the tension between the nationalities, which periodically would erupt into bloody clashes. The coming of Soviet power brought with it the eventual creation in the Caucasus of three union republics—Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan—but the old ethnic mix and the resultant tension persisted.

According to the canon of Marxism-Leninism, with these major nationalities being given their own states, national animosities should have subsided, since the real cause for all the ostensible manifestations lay in the economic and political enslavement of all the nationalities under the czars' reign. Against such prognoses ethnic troubles continued, even though Communist rule proved much more effective in preserving its own version of law and order than the czar did. Still, if ethnic enmities were an unwitting reaction to the frustrations of life under a despotic rule, that was truer of much of the Soviet period than before the Revolution. And with Stalin's death, the repressed national aspirations of the peoples of the Caucasus (as elsewhere) began to be aired in public, at first timidly, but with the onset of perestroika, quite boldly.

Officially, Nagorno-Karabakh had the status of an autonomous region within the Azerbaijan republic. Ethnically, it was a predominantly Armenian enclave (some 80 percent of the population of 180,000), separated from Armenia by territory inhabited by the Azerbaijanis. For years, representatives of the district's majority, as well as those of Armenia itself, had been petitioning Moscow for the transfer of the district to the latter. All such pleas were met with bureaucratic indifference. As the Armenian party head was to complain at the nineteenth party conference in June 1988: "The sources of the existing situation are found in the complex . . . problems arising from the distortion of the nationality policy during the periods of the cult of personality, and of stagnation." In other words, under Stalin nobody would have dared to complain; under Brezhnev nobody would listen.

The "existing situation" to which the Armenian chief referred was that of virtual warfare between the

two "fraternal" republics of the Soviet Union over possession of the tiny enclave. As perestroika proceeded, so did the Armenians' insistence that the district be joined to their republic, a demand that ran into obdurate resistance by Azerbaijan officials. Riots erupted in the area in February. That in turn led to huge demonstrations in Yerevan, the capital of Armenia, in which crowds estimated at nearly a million participated (the total population of the republic being around 3 million). Quite apart from the disputed district, there were a lot of Armenians living in Azerbaijan towns. And on February 27, in one of them, a clash between the two nationalities left at least 32 dead, the great majority of them Armenians. Their fellow nationals now began to flee Azerbaijan, while in Armenia mass protests escalated. Confronted by the crisis, Gorbachev appealed to both nations for calm, but privately complained that the Armenians "were stabbing perestroika in the back." Troops were sent to Armenia to enforce order. To its people this signified that Moscow, as before, favored the cause of their hereditary antagonists.

The subsequent course of the Azerbaijan-Armenian conflict lies outside this study. Suffice it to say that all the Kremlin's efforts to resolve it—use of force, persuasion, the temporary imposition of direct rule from Moscow—proved unavailing. It has festered to this day. What is pertinent to our theme is that the initial phase of the crisis illuminated the vulnerability of the Communist system, especially during the attempts to liberalize it, to the enmities of the ethnic groups within the Soviet state.

This is not to argue that democratization ought not to have been tried, or that the old ways could have been continued for long without bringing an even more violent explosion of national enmities and secessionist demands than that which would rack the Soviet Union from 1989 on. But Gorbachev and his aides underestimated the gravity and urgency of the nationalities problem.

In itself, at least to an outsider, the issue in contention in the Caucasian dispute could appear preposterously small to have triggered such serious and mournful consequences. In the past a peremptory order from Moscow had led on occasion to the resettlement of a population several times the size of that of the unfortunate district. But in this situation, as on other issues, the post-1953 Soviet regime was not able to sustain such a level of repression. By 1988 the celebrated paradox from *Through the Looking-Glass* was applicable to the situation in the Soviet Union: the regime would have to run very fast to keep in the same place. Freely translated, it carried a lesson that Gorbachev should avoid half-measures. Perestroika could not be accomplished through democratization. It could either set a course toward real democracy or it would run into trouble. The nationalities issue is a good case

in point. If in 1987 and 1988 the Kremlin had offered an imaginative plan to restructure the Soviet Union by granting real and substantial autonomy to the 15 republics, it would have, in all likelihood, been spared the subsequent demands for full independence. Events and the people's reaction to them showed that the Balts, the Georgians, and others who would have been content in 1988 if the Soviet Union had become a real rather than a fictitious federal commonwealth, would two years later be satisfied with nothing short of independence.

RESTRUCTURING THE PARTY-STATE

But the crucial consideration on this issue, just as on practically every other in Soviet life, was to be the role of the party. *Legally*, the republics and hence the major nationalities, did not need any new powers. Under the existing constitution (proclaimed by Stalin in 1936, amended slightly under Brezhnev in 1977) they enjoyed powers far surpassing those of the American states, including the right to secede from the union. But up until now the constitution was a part of the mythology of Soviet life, rather than anything having really to do with the rights of the union republics, or for that matter, with those of the individual citizens. The country was ruled by the party, and that again did not mean rule by its 19 million members, for the party statute was also a part of the mythology. Real power resided with the 20 to 25 men at the top of the party hierarchy, and as of 1988 they were chosen, just as under Brezhnev in the era of stagnation, by co-optation.

If perestroika was not to turn out to be just a show, all this had to be changed. Hence Gorbachev's first words to the 5,000 delegates to the nineteenth party conference that opened June 28, 1988: "The basic task [that faces us] is how to deepen and make irreversible the revolutionary perestroika that has been initiated and has been developing under the leadership of the party."

At the conference, the general secretary proposed and the conference agreed to establish a new political system in the Soviet Union, one that would combine democracy *and* one-party rule. How could a seasoned politician and a man endowed with his intelligence entertain such a fantastic notion? Some speakers at the conference tried to tell him, delicately and indirectly, that the idea was as hard to realize as squaring the circle. But Mikhail Sergeievich was a party man not only by profession but also emotionally.

Those seemingly incongruous bedfellows, democracy and one-party rule, were to be united under the auspices of the new Soviet constitution, whose general outline was presented at the conference. It was too much to expect that any constitution, no matter how finely crafted, could by itself smooth the path of perestroika. But quite apart from the glaring incongru-

ity of its two main motifs, the new constitution would turn out to be a most unwieldy political instrument, with several of its provisions impractical or obsolete already by the time it came into force.

The central and most awkward feature of this Rube Goldberg-like contraption was to be the Congress of People's Deputies. Two-thirds of this assembly of 2,250 representatives was to be elected by popular suffrage and one-third by "social organizations," a description encompassing such diverse organizations as the Communist party (100 delegates), the Academy of Sciences (20), and the Society of Philatelists (1). The Congress would meet annually and select one-fifth of its membership to constitute the Supreme Soviet; the two-tiered standing legislature would be expected to function like a Western-style parliament.

What was behind the cumbersome scheme was obvious. The Soviet state was to have real elections for the first time since 1918. Those 1,500 popular seats could—most of them would—be contested, rather than, as before, having just one candidate sponsored by the party. Thus quite a few, perhaps a sizable number, of the people elected by universal suffrage might turn out to be independents, critical of this or that aspect of the regime. But a great majority of those 750 deputies sent to the Congress by "social organizations" were bound to be individuals toeing the party line, and hence Gorbachev loyalists. There was to be the best of all possible worlds: democracy secured, one-party rule safeguarded, and an (almost) freely elected legislature with a firm proregime majority. In any event, it did not turn out that way. Even on the procedural side there would be great confusion as to the powers of the Congress concerning the Supreme Soviet. The story of prerevolutionary Russia's brief experience with parliamentarism (1906–1917) should have taught Gorbachev that you really cannot combine genuine parliamentarism with what might be called semiautocracy.

In general, however, the nineteenth party congress resulted in considerable success for Gorbachev. The party conference followed the counsel of neither the right nor the left. It voted for the middle course, which was, for all Gorbachev's language about its revolutionary character, exactly what the general secretary expected from perestroika.

Mikhail Sergeievich stood at the apogee of his career by the end of 1988. For all the ominous portents we have listed, it still would have required special prophetic powers to predict that within one year his leadership would be challenged, that party authority would have suffered a catastrophic blow, and that the Soviet Union would be in the process of losing its Eastern European empire, with its own unity endangered by separatist and nationalist forces.

One event accelerated all those developments and made them erupt simultaneously on the Soviet scene:

the elections for the Congress of People's Deputies, which took place in March 1989 and which marked a watershed in Soviet history, perhaps even more significant than the events of March 1985, when Gorbachev came to power.

We spoke before about the damage done to the reputation of the Communist party because of what glasnost has revealed about its past and also because of the loss of a sense of mission. What happened as the result of the elections went, however, much further. It was a veritable body blow to the role of the party, one from which it would not recover.

If one pay attention merely to numbers, the election may well have appeared as justifying Gorbachev's expectations. The great majority of the successful candidates were in principle supporters of perestroika. The diehard party conservatives were for the most part defeated. Superficially, the results justified the prediction Gorbachev made while casting his own ballot on March 26—"Elections will carry us and perestroika far forward"—and *Pravda's* headline the morning after: "Millions Vote for Perestroika—A Vote of Confidence for the Policy of Regenerating Soviet Society." But the numbers do not begin to tell the whole story.

Properly understood, the vote was one of nonconfidence in the Communist establishment. That the party was able to secure a majority of sorts was due first of all to the complex electoral procedure, to the undoubted tampering with the ballots in several places in the provinces, and of course to those seats reserved to the "social organizations" where the nomenklatura could be expected to score heavily—and by and large it did, though there were also some surprises for the regime. (Thus, despite considerable pressure on the Academy of Sciences *not* to elect Andrei Sakharov, he was eventually voted in.) But the overall impression had to be one of spectacular setbacks dealt to the party, with humiliating defeats of several of its notables. This was most obvious in the big cities, where it would have been difficult to tamper with the ballots or indulge in other chicaneries. The unofficial (there was no longer an official) party slate in Moscow and Leningrad was trounced. Many party bosses were repudiated by the voters in what had been their little kingdoms.

But even the spectacular defeats of the Communist establishment figures were overshadowed by the victories of those who were identified with the antiestablishment. Outstanding among them was Boris Yeltsin, who in a district coterminous with Moscow received 6 million votes, crushing the party hack put up against him. In the Baltic republics, reformers grouped in "popular fronts"—regional organizations based (though not explicitly) on the ethnic principle—secured the majority of the seats, the Lithuania one, Sajudis, winning in 31 out of 39 districts. Communist leaders in those areas had to go along with the local nationalist aspirations in order to be elected. Those aspirations,

demands for much wider autonomy or full independence, surfaced in other areas of the vast land.

The sum total of the developments centered around the elections to the Congress of People's Deputies spelled the end of the Communist party's domination of Soviet politics and of the entire one-party political culture. The party would remain an important element in Soviet politics, but it definitely ceased to be the decisive one.

The results of the elections had thus to be a blow to Gorbachev. He had hoped to nurse Soviet democracy through its infancy. He was suddenly confronted by an unruly adolescent. How much the results of the elections unnerved the leadership was demonstrated before the Congress of People's Deputies assembled. A peaceful demonstration in Tbilisi, Georgia, with the marchers carrying banners with nationalist slogans, was brutally dispersed by the troops of the local military districts. For reasons still not fully explained, soldiers resorted to the use of toxic gas and physically assailed the demonstrators. At least 20 demonstrators were killed, with many more injured. Orders for repression on that scale had to come from the center, and it is still not clear who issued the order to send in troops, and why, and whether Gorbachev himself was involved. The Georgian tragedy was only the most publicized of the many incidents of violence caused by ethnic tensions that were becoming endemic over large areas of the Soviet Union. As it was, the Tbilisi affair gave a powerful stimulus to the independence movement in Georgia.

AND PERESTROIKA?

Where, in what was becoming an increasingly chaotic situation, was perestroika? By the end of 1989 it had definitely ceased to be, if it ever was, a systematic program of reforms and had become a synonym for changes, some of them intended by the government, others to which it had been pushed by extraneous factors. What was also occurring was what might be called rebellion perestroika, such as was inherent in the various units of the federal system adopting reforms on their own and pressing for independence.

Gorbachev's position had undergone a considerable alteration. He was still enormously popular in the West, where he was credited, and on good grounds, with bringing an end to the cold war and, somewhat less justifiably, with consciously helping Eastern European countries get rid of their Communist regimes. But at home his popularity began to decline. This was largely, though not completely, because of the worsening economic situation.

The task of bringing the Soviet economy out of the doldrums and setting it on a steady course that would lead to immediately recognizable benefits in raising the standard of living and the amelioration of the environment would have overtaxed the resources of the most

resolute leader, even one with absolute power. Gorbachev's position from 1989 on fitted neither of these criteria. He had reluctantly accepted that the old dogmas of Marxism-Leninism had to be jettisoned. Soviet economists now virtually unanimously proclaimed that ideological superstitions were doing immeasurable harm to the well-being of the Soviet people and the vitality of the economy. The remedies were to be found in the free market, the open path to private initiative, and the dismantling of the entire collective-state farm system that had been the curse of Soviet agriculture for more than five decades. Most of the measures to implement those goals, while salutary in the end, were bound in the "short run" (conceivably taking years) to cause considerable hardships and unrest among the people. All of them involved tremendous administrative problems, as well as the overcoming of long-standing practices and prejudices.

Many of the difficulties could have been avoided if Gorbachev, like Stalin or even Brezhnev, could just crack the whip and be obeyed—if for example, prices on the necessities of life could be doubled overnight, and the people could be expected to suffer in silence rather than strike and riot. Now, with political power diffused and the regime no longer awesome, the Soviet consumer was unlikely to acquiesce in having his already unsatisfactory standard of living lowered still further and to suffer it in silence. Even without the government's resorting to measures of the kind described above, the worsening economic situation brought strikes, such as that by miners in the summer of 1990, on a scale unimaginable only a few years before.

With the fervor of neophytes, growing numbers of Soviet economists began to embrace the gospel of free enterprise. For them all the dangers and difficulties of the transition to the free market paled against the urgency of changing the old economic ways that had brought the country to the brink of disaster. The people, went their argument, would put up with an interlude of hardships if at the end of the road there was a clearly discernible goal of a free and dynamic economy, no more shortages of basic commodities, no more shoddy goods, and the overall appearance of a Soviet society no longer reminiscent of that of a third world country.

Mikhail Sergeievich's attitude toward a free-market economy remained similar to his view about the possibility of introducing democracy in the Soviet Union: yes, up to a point, but certainly not right away. And so progress toward economic perestroika was episodic and inconsistent. Joint ventures with foreign entrepreneurs were authorized but were intermittently overregulated. The same went for cooperative enterprises. Privatization of Soviet industry was proclaimed to be a legitimate goal, but again bureaucratic hurdles were erected in the path of its realization.

Mid-1989 concluded the first, and in retrospect, hopeful, phase of perestroika. With the meeting of the Congress of People's Deputies in May, the focus of political activity shifted not necessarily to the legislative bodies but certainly away from the Communist party. What had been the struggle to remake the state and society would soon be preempted by another and desperate effort by Gorbachev to preserve as much as possible the existing structure of Soviet power and to cling to the vestiges of the Communist creed. The great reformer became simultaneously and incongruously a defender of the status quo on issues such as the rights of the republics versus those of the center.

With the decline of the Communist party one would have expected the rise of another movement that would aspire to guide Soviet society. Once Gorbachev's popularity began to wane, there should have been some rivals aspiring to the top post. Yet it was a peculiarity of Soviet politics under perestroika that it produced no party seeking power at the all-union level. There was a profusion of fronts, blocs, and even parties, but practically all of them had regional constituencies and goals. It was characteristic that even democratically inclined members of the first Congress of People's Deputies who banded together called their association the *interregional group*. Somehow the term "party" had taken on a pejorative meaning. In June 1917 at the All-Russian Congress of the Soviets, one speaker declared that there was no single party ready to assume the staggering burden of governing what had been the Russian Empire. Lenin aroused universal merriment and disbelief when he shouted from the benches that yes! there was such a party—his own. What was said in 1917 was true also of the perestroika period.

NATIONALISM RAMPANT

We must return to the Achilles' heel of the Soviet system: the nationalities question. The travails of the Soviet Union and communism were reminiscent of those Russian dolls in which, after detaching the top segment of the figurine, one finds successively smaller and smaller dolls. The breakdown of the unity and ideological mission of the movement revealed and accentuated the tensions within the smaller entity—the socialist bloc. And with that bloc disintegrating and then reduced to the Soviet Union itself, its own unity and survival became subject to increasing pressures.

Gorbachev had had his hands full fighting the battle of perestroika on several fronts. Still, one must note his lack of foresight when it came to the issue of nationalities and preserving the unity of the country. As a statesman setting out to remake his society, he should have remembered how in prerevolutionary Russia every attempt to liberalize the autocratic system and any advance toward glasnost, no matter how modest, would bring the nationalities problem to the surface

and pose a quandary for the central government. Any relaxation of the regime would prompt the inmates to try to break out of their "prison house of nationalities." The Soviet period brought the nationalities formal equality and the fiction of a federal state. The primary and avowed purpose of perestroika had been to make those rights—so impressive on paper, so irrelevant to the actual process of Soviet politics—real.

It would be naive to think that even the wisest and most far-sighted policy on that count could have avoided trouble. Still, when the trouble came, it would not have had to be as far-reaching and seemingly intractable had Gorbachev and his associates shown themselves more sensitive to the problems of the multinational state emerging from autocracy and repression. He had tried to democratize the Soviet political scene while retaining the dominant role of the Communist party; he now proposed to reform the economy and yet somehow preserve its socialist character. Likewise, Gorbachev planned to turn the Soviet Union into a real federation while preserving undiminished the powers of the union. He would find himself in the position of the sorcerer's apprentice: unable to stop the very forces he had evoked. And while in regard to political and economic reforms the architect of perestroika would let himself be pushed far beyond where he originally proposed to stop, he would prove much more recalcitrant when it came to preserving undiminished the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

That the virus of independence should manifest itself first and most violently among the population of Lithuania was both unexpected and logical. Unexpected because of the relatively tiny size of the Lithuanian nation, and because the economic and geographic situation of the republic would make its complete separation from the Soviet Union fraught with great hardships for its inhabitants. One would have expected nationalist aspirations to explode more readily among the Ukrainians, the second-largest ethnic group in the Soviet Union, their republic having ample resources and meeting other conditions for a separate state existence. Stronger secessionist ambitions might have been expected also in Georgia, with its long history of independent statehood, or in Moldavia, where after its annexation in 1940 the Kremlin had renamed the Romanian-speaking majority of the population Moldavians.

At the same time, once the atmosphere of fear that had pervaded preperestroika Soviet politics abated, it was quite natural for Lithuania to surge to the forefront of those Soviet political entities seeking sovereignty and for the spokesmen of its people to define this term as implying secession from the Soviet state. Despite their previous inclusion in the Russian Empire and their forcible annexation in 1940, the three Baltic countries had remained the least politically assimilated parts of the Soviet Union. Of the three, Lithuania has

the highest percentage of native inhabitants among the population, and its people have shown themselves remarkably resistant to foreign domination, be it cultural or political. Even so, Latvia and Estonia were not far behind their fellow Baltic land in asserting, though more cautiously, their right to seek independence. In May 1990 all three adopted legislation proclaiming their sovereignty.

In the Soviet Union, 1990 thus might be called the year of sovereignty and, by the same token, the testing time for the survival of the union itself. This is not the place to give a detailed account of the effort to preserve some form of the union, a struggle that ended with its disintegration. What is pertinent for us is the connection between that process and the decline of communism as a world movement, the abdication by its Soviet branch of its universal mission. Here the causal relation is unmistakable. No sooner did the rulers of the Soviet Union explicitly abandon the mission to remake the world in a Marxist-Leninist image than power began to slip out of their hands. With communism no longer able to sustain the fiction that it was the wave of the future, the Communist party could no longer act as the glue which held the multinational state together.

THE MOMENT OF TRUTH

The Communist era in the country first known as Russia and later on as the Soviet Union began with the successful putsch of November 7, 1917, and concluded with the abjectly unsuccessful one of August 19, 1991. The first was a daring move by a handful of zealots leading a motley crowd of soldiers, workers, and sailors, not only to seize power but to ignite the fires of world revolution; the latter, a clumsy attempt by a junta of aging oligarchs to reimpose the Communist version of law and order, not in the name of any revolutionary ideas, but to preserve the power and privileges of a decrepit bureaucracy. The failure of the putsch reaffirmed what had been said earlier: an attempt to reinstall dictatorship in the Soviet Union of 1991 would prove even more difficult than steering the state toward effective democracy and an orderly economy.

"A wretched country; they don't even know how to hang properly," a nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary was reputed to have exclaimed when the hangman's rope broke under his weight. And now conspiratorial skill appeared to have been completely missing in such alleged experts of the craft as Vladimir Kryuchkov, head of the KGB, and Minister of the Interior Boris Pugo (himself with a long KGB background). They failed to move with dispatch, to secure such people bound to oppose the coup as Russian President Boris Yeltsin and former Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze; within hours Yeltsin was on the Moscow streets calling on the citizens to rise against

the junta and for a general strike. In Leningrad another dauntless reformer, its mayor, Anatoli Sobchak, galvanized even larger crowds to stand up for democracy. In 70 hours the foolish enterprise was over; seven of the junta arrested, one a suicide, and a shaken Gorbachev being flown back to Moscow after being detained in the Crimea.

Could a more professionally staged coup have succeeded? Those who would lean to that conclusion could point to the fact that most of the civilian government personnel (including virtually the entire council of ministers) and the higher military ranks initially supported the putsch. Most of the local party bosses did likewise, some of them being among the active plotters. And among the leaders of the non-Russian republics there were quite a few who for the first few hours adopted a wait-and-see attitude. But the essential condition for the success of such a venture—firm support by the officer corps, the KGB, and the party state machinery—was lacking. Ever since 1989, power in the Soviet Union had become too diffused to be scooped up by one sudden blow, and then through the years of glasnost Soviet society had become, if not exactly democratic, too agitated to remain passive in the face of this blatant attempt to turn the clock back.

On October 13, 1964, Nikita Khrushchev had been the generally venerated leader of the Soviet state and people; on October 14 it was announced that through a secretly arrived decision by some 12 to 15 people (in the Politburo) he had become an emeritus, and the attitude of the mass of the people remained one of complete indifference. Now it was different. Soviet men and women, including those in uniform, felt themselves to be citizens, and though most of them may have had scant sympathy for Gorbachev or concern for constitutional proprieties, they would not passively accept such presumption by a bunch of faceless bureaucrats. "We older folk used to express what we really thought by whispering in the kitchen. Now our children spoke out loudly in the city's streets and avenues," a Soviet journalist exultantly wrote.

One should not overromanticize what happened between August 19 and 22. Had the coup been carried out more efficiently, had not some army units taken Yeltsin's side, the plotters might have succeeded in seizing Moscow and Leningrad. But that would have meant bloodshed and a civil war, which the Kryuchkov clique could not have won.

"Gorbachev Returns to Power," proclaimed Western press headlines on August 23. He did return, but the president's power, already severely constricted before the coup, was now at its nadir. Yeltsin, the hero of the hour, vetoed Gorbachev's appointments of new ministers and forced him to accept those he himself nominated. The triumphant president of the Russian republic could not resist the temptation of publicly humiliating the president of the Soviet Union. At a

session of the Russian parliament he kept interrupting Gorbachev's speech and bossing him around. Gorbachev's first utterances on his return showed his unawareness that the political situation and the public mood were now greatly different than they had been on August 18. He still expressed his belief that the Communist party should not only continue to exist but also act as a leading force in Soviet society, still thought that the outdated Treaty of the Union should provide the basis for the future Soviet Union; yet at the very same time Yeltsin was decreeing the suspension of all party activities on the territory of the Russian republic and shutting down its press organs. Heads of the other republics, anxious to compensate for their ambivalent reaction to the putsch, hastened to follow in Yeltsin's footsteps. "Does Gorbachev understand that he has returned to what is now a different country?" a newspaper perspicaciously asked.

Rather belatedly, Mikhail Sergeievich did understand. Within a week of his rescue he laid down the office of the general secretary and called upon the Central Committee of the Communist party of the Soviet Union to dissolve itself. By this time the appeal appeared superfluous: all over the Soviet Union the party's offices were being raided and shut down, its archives and files, as well as those of the KGB, seized by the local authorities. What for 70 years had been hailed as "the pride and conscience of the nation," "the vanguard of the world proletariat"—the celebrated and mighty Communist party of the Soviet Union—for all practical purposes ceased to exist; its formal dissolution would come merely as a death certificate. All over the vast land crowds were dismantling statues of Lenin and other Communist notables. Along with those momentous developments there arose a very practical question: Who would inherit the enormous wealth of the party, estimated at upward of five billion rubles?

But that question seemed trivial when compared with another problem of inheritance. It was the Communist party that had, though in the last three years increasingly shakily, held the Soviet Union together. Who or what could inherit that function? The trauma of August 19–21 made explicit what had been implicit ever since March 26, 1989: the Soviet Union was falling apart and it would take a quite unexpected turn of events to arrest the trend. As it was, during those post-August 21 days all the non-Russian republics, led by the largest of them, the Ukraine, hurriedly proclaimed their independence. Again that term, like "sovereignty," could as yet be interpreted in various ways, expressing the desire of at least some of them not necessarily to break off all the ties with Moscow but, rather, to have the Soviet Union transformed into a loose form of confederation. But there could be no mistaking the resolve of the three Baltic republics to acquire the full paraphernalia of independent statehood. And even before Gorbachev and the Congress of

the People's Deputies grudgingly acquiesced in their secession, foreign countries began to recognize formally the independence of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

The impetus to full independence among the non-Russians was undoubtedly strengthened not only by the putsch, but also by Yeltsin's incautious behavior following its failure. By bossing Gorbachev around, by giving a strong impression at least initially that Russia was intent on dominating what remained of the Soviet Union, the president of the Russian republic could not but intensify the long-standing fears and resentments among other nations of the Soviet Union. Especially injudicious was Yeltsin's threat—to be sure, almost immediately withdrawn—that were some other republics to opt entirely out of the union, Russia might demand border rectification, that is, to claim those areas of sister republics where ethnic Russians constitute a high proportion of the populations. Said the head of Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev, "Kazakhstan will never acquiesce in becoming an 'appendix' of another region, will never accept the role of being a 'younger brother' of another nation."

As August gave way to the following months, the tumult and confusion receded and Yeltsin and Gorbachev joined in an attempt to find what was still salvageable from the Soviet Union. Among the people the elation of the post-putsch days began to give way to a sober realization of the trials and dangers ahead. There could be no doubt now that perestroika had failed, that what had been conceived as restructuring had the effect of a demolition. As Anatoli Sobchak phrased it: "Our great mistake during those six years had been to try to reform what was unreformable." There was a hurried effort, through yet another constitutional improvisation, to patch up the foundering Soviet ship of state, but this failed and by December the union had totally dissolved, with 11 of the 15 former republics forming a loose association in what was called the Commonwealth of Independent States (Georgia and the Baltics declining to join).

A LOOK AHEAD

The lesson of the year of revolutions, 1917, teaches that the overthrow of an autocracy does not by itself

clear the path to democracy. The crowds that demonstrated their jubilation over the overthrow of czarism were no less inspired by the passion for freedom than those that during the August days, answering the appeal of Yeltsin and Sobchak, poured onto the streets of Moscow and Leningrad (restored to its old name, St. Petersburg, in one of the last acts of the Congress of People's Deputies). Enthusiasm alone, however, is not a sufficient foundation for a stable democratic society. The budding democracy of the 1917 Russia, which Lenin himself called the freest state in the world, failed to develop a network of institutional defenses, and hence succumbed rather easily to the Bolshevik coup in November.

To show reservation about the changes in the Soviet Union is to realize the horrendous harm that communism has done to societies over which it had ruled, and especially to the Soviet Union. If with Stalin dead and buried, Stalinism still had clung to Soviet policies, then with the Communist party of the Soviet Union in shambles its legacy—the disastrous condition to which it had brought society—still stands in the way of the former Soviet republics' quest for democracy. And by the same token this legacy poses a threat to the world order: a fragmented Soviet Union, its parts now independent states, some of them not inconceivably under a dictatorship, that might prove a no lesser danger to international stability than that which had been posed by the Soviet Union at the height of its power. For almost 50 years we had worried about what the "Communists" might do to us. Now the West is concerned, and justifiably so, about the consequences of what the Soviets had been doing to themselves.

Communism drew its strengths and appeal from the claim that it was the only ideology and movement that could rise above nationalism and establish a peaceful and stable state. Ever since 1948 that boast, as we have seen, was repeatedly refuted by events. And it is an irony of history that the claim of communism being a force for peace among nations should finally be laid to rest in its birthplace. ■

BOOK REVIEWS

ON THE FORMER SOVIET UNION

Bear Hunting with the Politburo: A Gritty First-Hand Account of Russia's Young Entrepreneurs—And Why Soviet-Style Capitalism Can't Work
By A. Craig Copetas. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991. 269 pp., \$22.00.

In the late 1980s, you could almost hear the stampede of American businesspeople who streamed into Moscow like Scouts on their first excursion. Expecting to find elderly people needing help to cross the street into the world market, the troop's members were soon disenchanted by what they saw as confidence men and ladies of ill repute who were not as interested in the Scouts' handbooks or oaths as they were in the loose change in their pockets. Many of the Americans came home with that peculiar sensation familiar to adolescents returning from a red-light district—knowing they'd been had but not really knowing what happened.

This irreverent image of Americans coming of age in Russia is much the way in which Copetas views the effect perestroika has had on the West. *Bear Hunting with the Politburo* is the result of the six years he spent in Moscow. Half of that time he was with Vladimir Yakovlev ("Yak"), the founder of Cooperative Fact (FACT), Russia's first privately owned news and information service.

According to Copetas, capitalism as Westerners understand it cannot work in Russia because of the overwhelming cynicism that pervades daily life; it is not a cynicism derived from a sense of disillusionment with the government or the economy, but from the knowledge that success is achieved through connections and influence, not hard work or inventiveness. Perestroika, as Copetas sees it, has not altered the fundamental corruption in all aspects of government and business, but simply allowed more people to participate in it. As he quickly learned, "too many Soviets found it easier and safer to work perestroika as an angle."

Perhaps the most compelling evidence Copetas provides is the success of FACT when compared with other cooperatives. While Yak understands and employs the corrupt tactics of the bureaucracy, other zealous new businesspeople fail to do so and so fall by the wayside. The only cooperatives that survive are those that play the government's game. Instead of a business ethic based on competition and some degree of fairness, these new entrepreneurs thrive on back scratching and wholesale graft.

Taken as a symbol of the new Russian entrepreneur,

Yak is a tragic figure. A con artist whose charm is interwoven with a wry sense of humor and fatalism, he understands all too well that working in the system is like playing a game and so never takes anything very seriously. Like a character from a Milan Kundera novel, Yak is constantly satisfying an absurdist bureaucracy while at the same time trying to run a legitimate business. It is when his company becomes successful and he begins dealing with Western businesses that readers begin to see that what it takes for him survive in the Russian system leaves him unable to establish any meaningful or lucrative contact with the West.

Bear Hunting offers neither the crushing banality of a World Bank report on Russia's economy nor the ultra-chic, too-hip-to-care sensationalism of some reports of life in Moscow. For all its cheekiness, Copetas's book is a well-balanced, thoughtful rendering of Russia's new businesspeople and the society they have inherited.

Sean Patrick Murphy

Burying Lenin: The Revolution in Soviet Ideology and Foreign Policy

By Steven Kull. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1992. 219 pp., \$37.95, cloth; \$15.95, paper.

If ideology is the glue that made the Soviet Union a strong hegemonic power for decades, could it also have been the solvent responsible for its dissolution?

This question, which Kull puts forward in his book, is sure to strike a resonant note for the many who are asking why the Soviet Union broke up and how it did so with a minimum of violence. Describing a change in thinking among top Soviet policymakers, Kull offers compelling evidence that a poor economy and social discontent were not the most important factors that led to the nation's rapid disintegration. By quoting interviews with these Soviet officials, policy statements, and public speeches, Kull attempts to show the evolution of Soviet ideology from Lenin's universalistic ideas to Gorbachev's more pluralistic views. Rather than viewing the Soviet leadership as bound to obsolete principles and somehow hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world, the author describes how changes in world events and in the sciences and philosophy played a large part in the leadership's move toward allowing a more open, tolerant society.

By offering the notion that the change in the leadership's views was the catalyst for the unraveling of the Soviet Union, Kull has come up with a view that many cold warriors may find hard to swallow: simply put, the Soviets changed their minds.

S. P. M.

THE MONTH IN REVIEW

AUGUST 1992

INTERNATIONAL

Middle East Peace Conference

Aug. 24—The 6th round of talks opens in Washington, D.C.; it is planned to last a month, with separate meetings between Lebanese, Palestinian, and Syrian delegates and representatives from Israel.

At the conference, Israel says it is willing to discuss with Syria the status of the Golan Heights, which has been occupied by Israel since the 1967 Six Day War. This is the 1st time Israel has recognized the area as negotiable.

North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)

Aug. 12—American, Canadian, and Mexican officials announce they have agreed on a plan to integrate their economies; the North American Free Trade Agreement, which must be ratified before January 1, 1994, by the legislatures of each country, will gradually eliminate a wide variety of trade barriers and create the largest free trade zone in the world.

United Nations (UN)

(See also *Intl.*, *Yugoslav Crisis*; *Afghanistan*; *Iraq*; *Somalia*)

Aug. 9—*The New York Times* reports that Enzo Gianni Murzi, head of the UN Children's Fund (UNICEF) delegation to Iraq, has said the Iraqi government has refused to issue travel and residency permits to members of his organization since an agreement with the UN allowing relief workers in the country expired at the end of June; as a result, UNICEF workers can only deliver supplies and medical aid to the residents of Baghdad; Murzi also said that as many as 300,000 children in Iraq under age 5 are suffering serious weight loss and said he is concerned about a measles epidemic that could affect hundreds of thousands of children.

Aug. 12—In Nairobi, UN representative Mohammed Sahnoun announces that General Mohammed Farah Aidid, leader of one of the 2 groups vying for power in Somalia, has agreed to allow 500 UN troops into the country to protect convoys of relief supplies; as many as 2 million people in Somalia are in danger of imminent starvation.

Aug. 13—The Security Council votes, 12-0, to allow "all necessary measures"—including military force—to ensure the flow of relief supplies to Bosnia and Herzegovina; the resolution says nations may act unilaterally or through regional agencies when delivering aid or providing security for deliveries, and it demands that the Red Cross and other relief agencies be allowed unhindered access to detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina; China, India, and Zimbabwe abstain from the vote.

Yugoslav Crisis

(See also *Intl.*, *UN*; *Israel*; *US*)

Aug. 1—After attempting for a day and a half to break through Serb-controlled areas north of Sarajevo, the capital of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bosnian forces withdraw.

Aug. 4—UN officials say they will close Sarajevo's airport and suspend relief flights for 72 hours because of heavy shelling by forces ringing the capital.

Aug. 5—On the 7th day of continuing Bosnian efforts to regain control of areas surrounding Sarajevo, Serb attacks on the city intensify; as many as 250 Bosnian soldiers have died in

the offensive, which commanders say has been successful in portions of the suburbs and in the town of Trnovo.

Aug. 8—Red Cross officials say Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic has granted them permission to inspect 12 detention camps in Bosnia; journalists report they have evidence that many prisoners are being moved from Omarska to other camps in the country; Bosnian officials claim that as many as 17,000 Muslims and Croats have been executed in these camps, while Serb representatives claim 6,000 Serbs have been killed in Muslim and Croat camps.

Serb forces backed by the Serbian-dominated Yugoslav army increase shelling attacks on Bihac, a largely Muslim city in Bosnia; Serb commanders have said in radio broadcasts that they will cease the attacks, which began in June, if the city's residents agree to evacuate.

Aug. 10—Officials in Sarajevo say the city has less than 2 weeks of flour in reserve to feed its approximately 400,000 remaining residents.

Yugoslav Prime Minister Milan Panic announces that the rump state's army would not attack Western military forces if they were deployed in Bosnia, but warns that the country's 2 republics—Serbia and Montenegro—would defend themselves if attacked.

Aug. 11—Serb troops say they will allow the evacuation of mothers and young children from Sarajevo.

The parliament of the Serb state in Bosnia adopts a resolution stating their republic will cooperate with the UN in Bosnia.

Aug. 14—French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas announces his government has pledged 1,100 soldiers and equipment to protect relief efforts in Bosnia; there are currently 2,700 French peacekeeping troops in Croatia.

Aug. 15—A UN convoy with 8 truckloads of food and medical supplies reaches the predominantly Muslim city of Gorazde in Bosnia, where between 70,000 and 100,000 citizens have been cut off by a Serb blockade since April.

Aug. 18—The UN suspends the airlift to Sarajevo after a British cargo plane reports it may have been the target of hostile fire from a Croat-controlled antiaircraft position; US Defense Department officials say such cases are difficult to investigate since as many as 19 separate militias operate in Bosnia with little central command.

Croatian Vice President Mate Granic says male Bosnian refugees in Croatia have been rounded up by Croatian police and forced to return to Bosnia, where they have often been conscripted into local military units; Bosnian Vice President Ejup Ganic says the deportation of Bosnian males aged 18 to 60 from Croatia is provided for under an accord the 2 countries signed last month.

In London, British Prime Minister John Major announces Britain will offer 1,800 troops for the UN relief mission in Bosnia.

Aug. 19—*The New York Times* reports UN relief convoys have reached Bihac.

Aug. 20—UN relief flights to Sarajevo resume.

A Ukrainian soldier in the UN peacekeeping force in the Bosnian capital is killed by sniper fire.

Aug. 22—Thirty people are killed in fighting in Sarajevo; 2 British and 2 French members of the UN force are wounded in separate attacks in Bosnia.

Aug. 24—The Yugoslav news agency Tanyug says 1,700 artillery shells have landed in Sarajevo during the past day, killing 20 people; UN relief flights to the capital are suspended because of the heavy fighting.

Aug. 25—Lord Carrington, the EC envoy responsible for attempting to negotiate peace in the former Yugoslavia, resigns.

Aug. 27—At an international conference in London, Serbian President Slobodan Milosevic and Karadzic agree to end the siege of Sarajevo, eliminate detention camps, and turn over the heavy weaponry used in the fighting to UN forces; they also agree to honor the borders of the new countries as established at independence, recognize the countries' governments, and return territory gained as the result of recent fighting.

Aug. 28—At least 10 people are killed and 60 wounded as Serb shelling of Sarajevo continues.

Aug. 29—In London, Karadzic announces the end of the siege of Gorazde, but Ganic says fighting there has not ended.

In Sarajevo, 3 French UN peacekeepers are wounded when their armored personnel carrier comes under attack in a Serb-held area of the capital.

Aug. 30—Serb and Yugoslav army troops begin withdrawing from around Gorazde.

An artillery shell lands in a crowded Sarajevo marketplace, killing 15 people and wounding about 100; it is unclear who fired the shell.

Aug. 31—UN officials cancel a relief convoy to Gorazde because of heavy fighting in the city.

AFGHANISTAN

Aug. 8—In the capital city of Kabul, shelling by rival guerrilla groups kills 24 people and 4 rockets destroy the city's television transmission equipment; members of the Hezb-i-Islami guerrilla group—one of the 3 groups that make up the coalition government—have been attacking government forces in an effort to remove General Rashid Doestam from the administration; Doestam was an army commander under President Najibullah before he sided with guerrilla forces.

Aug. 9—Fighting between factions loyal to the coalition government and rebel guerrillas kills 11 people and wounds 30 in Kabul; thousands flee the capital.

Aug. 10—A Defense Ministry spokesman announces that as many as 1,000 people in Kabul have been wounded or killed today in the heaviest rocket barrage to hit the capital since the beginning of the civil war 14 years ago.

Aug. 13—Hezb-i-Islami rebels fire rockets into Kabul, killing at least 100 people and wounding hundreds more.

Aug. 20—In Peshawar, Pakistan, Hezb-i-Islami officials say their guerrillas ambushed a convoy of 3,000 Uzbek militiamen en route to Kabul; they do not provide casualty figures.

Aug. 23—UN representative Sotirios Mousouris announces the organization will deliver \$10-million worth of food and medical supplies to the capital and to areas with refugees who have fled the fighting.

Government officials ask the UN to turn over former President Najibullah to them; Najibullah is believed to be in the UN compound in Kabul, which has been evacuated by all but Afghan employees.

Aug. 24—Diplomatic representatives from Bulgaria, France, India, Italy, and Poland leave Kabul in a convoy headed for the northern city of Mazar-e-Sharif, where they will be evacuated by a French military plane.

Aug. 27—At least 14 Hezb-i-Islami rockets hit the Russian embassy in Kabul, wounding 2 technical personnel.

Aug. 28—Hezb-i-Islami rebels fire on a Russian plane carrying the ambassador to Afghanistan, wounding 4 Russian commandos on board and forcing the plane to land; the attack

comes after a cease-fire between government and rebel forces was to have begun; 2 other planes evacuate 120 Russian embassy employees and their dependents after Moscow decides to close its mission in the capital.

ALGERIA

Aug. 9—Government officials suspend the publication of 3 newspapers in Algiers, saying the papers were critical of the administration's policies.

Aug. 26—Prime Minister Belaid Abdessalam announces that a bomb explosion in the capital's airport killed 9 people and wounded more than 100 today; no group claims responsibility for the action, or for the planting of 2 bombs in a downtown Algiers airline offices, one of which exploded and the other of which was defused.

ANGOLA

Aug. 11—Officials report clashes between government forces and those of the rebel National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) in the provincial capital of Malange City, breaking a 1991 cease-fire; at least 9 people have been killed and dozens wounded over the last 5 days.

BAHAMAS

Aug. 20—Preliminary results from yesterday's parliamentary elections show that the ruling Progressive Liberal party has lost 16 of its 32 seats in the 49-member House of Assembly and that the Free National Movement has gained control; it is expected to select for the prime ministership its leader, Hubert Ingraham; Progressive Liberal party leader Lynden Pindling has held the prime ministership since 1967.

BRAZIL

Aug. 24—Ending a 3-month inquiry, a congressional panel says President Fernando Collor de Mello and his family have received \$23 million as a result of a variety of corrupt dealings; the report recommends Collor's impeachment. Tens of thousands of demonstrators in Rio de Janeiro also call for Collor's impeachment; the president's term is scheduled to end January 1, 1995.

Aug. 25—Hundreds of thousands of citizens demanding Collor's impeachment demonstrate in 25 cities.

Aug. 27—Army troops briefly occupy parts of Rio de Janeiro; military officials say the soldiers were testing field radios; similar maneuvers were held in São Paulo 2 weeks ago.

Aug. 28—Navy Minister Admiral Mário César Flores meets with Collor to urge the president to resign.

CANADA

(See *Intl.*, NAFTA)

CHINA

Aug. 5—A Beijing court sentences Gao Shan, a former official at an institute studying political restructuring, to a 4-year jail sentence for leaking state secrets during the 1989 Tiananmen Square democracy demonstrations; the institute's director, ex-Politburo political secretary Bao Tong, received a 7-year sentence on similar charges last month.

Aug. 7—In Washington, China signs a memorandum of understanding with the US; in the document, it pledges to investigate charges that prison labor is being used to produce exports sent to the US.

Aug. 10—In the Shenzhen special economic zone, an estimated 50,000 people riot when the Bank of China runs out of applications to purchase stock in 14 companies; 1 million

people reportedly stood in line to obtain applications, which had a 10% chance of approval.

Aug. 19—*The New York Times* reports today that Han Dongfang, who led a workers organization during the 1989 democracy movement, has been issued a passport and given permission to leave the country for medical treatment.

Aug. 24—China and South Korea formally establish diplomatic relations.

Aug. 25—In Beijing, Wu Jiaxiang, a senior government researcher and protégé of party leader Zhao Ziyang, is sentenced to 3 years in prison for counterrevolutionary crimes and then released for time served; he is apparently the last person remaining in China to be tried in connection with the 1989 democracy movement.

COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES (CIS)

(See also *Afghanistan*)

Aug. 3—Russia and Ukraine sign an interim agreement on the Black Sea Fleet under which the fleet's bases and 300 ships will be placed under joint command for 3 years.

Aug. 6—Meeting in Moscow with the foreign ministers of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev proposes 1994 as the deadline for withdrawal of Russian troops from the Baltic states; Russia's conditions include the Baltics' renouncing of claims to land lost to Russia and amending of laws that infringe on the rights of ethnic Russians.

Aug. 9—Invoking a collective security treaty signed by 6 CIS member states in May, President Levon Ter-Petrosyan of Armenia requests help from the 5 other countries in what he calls Azerbaijan's "undeclared war" against Armenia. Recently, Azerbaijani troops captured Artsvashen, an Armenian-populated pocket of western Azerbaijan.

Aug. 19—In a televised speech, Russian President Boris Yeltsin presents details of a privatization program for large state-owned companies that will begin October 1; under the plan, managers and employees may bid for 51% of a company's assets, and vouchers worth 10,000 rubles each for the remaining 49% will be distributed to all citizens.

Aug. 31—The Itar-Tass and Nega news agencies report from Tajikistan that opposition members calling for the resignation of President Rakhman Nabiyev today occupied part of the presidential palace in the capital of Dushanbe and took 4 government officials hostage; the opposition has called for democratic reform and charged Rakhman with failing to stop ethnic strife.

CZECHOSLOVAKIA

Aug. 25—At talks in Brno on future relations between Slovakia and the Czech lands, Slovak Prime Minister Vladimir Meciar tells reporters, "We assume that the Czechoslovak federation will cease to exist by January 1, 1993."

ESTONIA

(See *CIS*)

FRANCE

(See *Intl.*, *Yugoslav Crisis*; *Iraq*)

GEORGIA

Aug. 11—In the town of Zugdidi in Abkhazia, 12 top security officials—including Interior Minister Roman Gventsadze—are kidnapped by supporters of ousted President Zviad Gamsakhurdia as they arrive for talks on the release of Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Kavsadze, whom the militants have held hostage since last month; 1 official is later released. The Abkhazian autonomous region, in western Georgia, declared its independence in July; 18% of the region's 550,000 residents are ethnic Abkhazians.

Aug. 14—The pro-Gamsakhurdia militants release their remaining hostages.

Aug. 15—Georgian and Abkhazian government leaders agree to a 2d cease-fire in Sukhumi, the capital of Abkhazia; a cease-fire set for yesterday was ignored. Thousands of Georgian national guard troops, led by Defense Minister Tengiz Kitovani, were sent to Abkhazia this week to flush out militant Gamsakhurdia supporters, and have been fighting street battles with secessionists in the capital.

Aug. 18—Government troops take control of Sukhumi, but militants cut the country's main railway link to Russia and Armenia. At least 100 people have been killed since last month in fighting in Abkhazia.

Aug. 26—About 1,500 Abkhazian militiamen attack the western Georgian town of Gagra, near the border with Russia, and battle with Georgian troops; dozens are reported killed. Last weekend more than 1,000 volunteers from the northern Caucasus region, including many from southern Russia, arrived to join the separatists.

Aug. 29—Russian television reports a cease-fire agreement has been reached by Kitovani and Vladislav Ardzinba, chairman of the Abkhazian parliament; the truce is to begin August 31.

GERMANY

Aug. 26—The Baltic port city of Rostock enters its 5th day of rioting aimed against foreigners, organized by neo-Nazi and far-rightist youth groups from throughout the country; police have arrested more than 300 rioters, many in incidents at hostels for refugees seeking political asylum.

In the town of Eberswalde, 25 miles northeast of Berlin, 400 local and federal police officers skirmish with members of a neo-Nazi group outside a refugee hostel; 32 youths are arrested and charged with disorderly conduct.

HAITI

Aug. 14—Police take into custody over 150 refugees after their boat is turned back by the US Coast Guard; government officials say they will release most of the passengers and will detain only those who planned the escape.

INDIA

Aug. 10—In Bhaktigarh, in Punjab state, Sikh militants execute 17 relatives of police officers; elsewhere in the state, as many as 30 similar killings take place. The murders are apparently in retaliation for the death yesterday of Sukhdev Singh Babbar, president of the Babbar Khalsa International, a militant group of Sikh separatists; Babbar died while in police custody.

Aug. 22—*The New York Times* reports the arrest this month of Venkataraman Krishnamurthy, an aide to Prime Minister P. V. Rao, on bribery charges in the widening banking and stock market manipulation scandal that led to a monthlong closing of the Bombay stock market in June and July. Commerce Minister Palaniappan Chidambaram resigned last month after disclosing he had invested in a firm that is under investigation.

IRAQ

(See also *Intl.*, *UN*)

Aug. 1—Kamal Fuad, a representative of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, announces that his organization killed 27 rebels of the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan on July 30 in Kalar; he said the attack was in retaliation for the killing of 2 of his group's members by the rival faction.

Aug. 9—A UN weapons inspection team conducts a surprise visit at an undisclosed location; the inspection, the first since Iraqi authorities refused entry to a similar group last month at the Agriculture Ministry building in Baghdad, occurred without incident.

Aug. 18—British Prime Minister John Major and French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas announce that their governments and the US have agreed on a plan to shoot down Iraqi military planes crossing the 32d parallel into Shiite-controlled territory in southern Iraq; the announcement comes a month after such planes were used to attack Shiite positions in the south.

Aug. 25—In Washington, US Defense Department officials say Iraq has withdrawn all its fixed-wing aircraft to above the 32d parallel, but that some helicopters continue to fly in the area.

Aug. 26—The US, Britain, and France give the Iraqi government 24 hours to cease all aircraft flights in the country below the 32d parallel.

Aug. 27—Aircraft from the USS *Independence* fly over southern Iraq unchallenged.

ISRAEL

(See also Intl., Middle East Peace Conference; US)

Aug. 4—Israeli troops kill 3 Arabs who army officials say entered the occupied West Bank from Jordan; Party of God rebels claim responsibility for the attack, in which 2 Israeli soldiers were wounded.

Aug. 5—Israeli Foreign Minister Shimon Peres announces that Israel will begin sending relief supplies to Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Aug. 24—Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin revokes orders to expel 11 Palestinians who were accused of inciting violence in the occupied territories last January; the revocation comes 1 day after Rabin announced the release of 800 Arab prisoners and the relaxation of restrictions on Palestinians in the territories.

Aug. 26—In the West Bank town of Jenin, undercover agents kill 2 Palestinian gunmen believed to be members of the militant Black Panther group; one agent and an Arab woman are also killed in the hourlong firefight.

JAPAN

Aug. 18—Finance Minister Tsutomu Hata announces measures aimed at halting the Tokyo stock market's decline; these include permitting financial institutions to delay reporting company losses and encouraging banks to write new loans. Earlier in the day the Nikkei index of stocks fell 620.14 points, or 4.2% of its value, to 14,309.41, its lowest close in more than 6 years; it is now 62% below the 1989 record.

Aug. 28—In a bid to stimulate the economy, the government announces a one-time spending increase of about \$86 billion, mainly for public works; it also plans measures, including tax breaks for bad loans, to aid the banking system, which has been weakened by falling stock and real estate values; growth in GNP had been estimated at around 2% this year, and the spending package is expected to double that. Parliament is not expected to convene until October to approve a supplementary budget.

Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa accepts the resignation of Shin Kanemaru, vice president of the ruling Liberal Democratic party and the most powerful politician in the country; Kanemaru submitted his resignation yesterday after admitting he accepted an unreported \$4-million contribution in 1990 from Tokyo Sagawa Kyubin, a parcel delivery and trucking company.

KENYA

(See US)

KOREA, NORTH

Aug. 6—The *Far Eastern Economic Review* reports that negotiators from both Koreas met July 28 in Panmunjom, on the border between the 2 countries, and agreed to open 2 searoutes and 1 overland route, linking them for the 1st time since the Korean war.

KOREA, SOUTH

(See China; Korea, North)

KUWAIT

Aug. 3—The 1st of what may amount to 5,000 US troops land in Kuwait to prepare for desert maneuvers; US President George Bush announced last week that an additional 2,400 soldiers would be sent to the country to take part in the action.

Aug. 31—An Interior Ministry official says a Kuwaiti policeman died yesterday of wounds sustained in a firefight with Iraqis along the disputed border between Kuwait and Iraq.

LATVIA

(See CIS)

LEBANON

Aug. 21—The *New York Times* reports the 3 main parties in the government's Christian coalition have called for a 3-day general strike to begin today; the move is to protest the presence of 35,000 Syrian troops in central Lebanon; under an agreement between Christian and Muslim groups, the forces are to be moved to the eastern border with Syria at the end of September.

Aug. 24—Speaker of Parliament Hussein al-Husseini resigns, charging the Party of God with electoral fraud in yesterday's parliamentary elections, the 1st in 2 decades; Iranian-backed Party of God candidates are believed to have won twice the number of votes as Hussein's pro-government group in the eastern town of Baalbek.

Aug. 30—Many Christians continue to boycott elections as the 2d round gets under way in Beirut and central Lebanon.

LITHUANIA

(See CIS)

MEXICO

(See Intl., NAFTA)

MONGOLIA

Aug. 6—According to the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, parliament has approved Mongolian People's Revolutionary party candidate Puntsagiyn Jasray as prime minister.

MOZAMBIQUE

Aug. 5—In Rome, President Joaquim Chissano and Mozambique National Resistance rebel leader Afonso Dhlakama agree to an October 1 cease-fire in the 17-year civil war.

NIGERIA

Aug. 7—The National Electoral Commission announces that primary elections will be held beginning September 5; widespread electoral fraud led the commission to cancel primary elections that began August 1; the primaries will winnow the

field of candidates for December's presidential elections to 2 from 20.

PAKISTAN

Aug. 8—Air Marshal Feroz Khan returns from the US after failing to win the release of 11 F-16 planes the US has impounded under the Pressler amendment, which bans the sale of arms to countries with secret nuclear programs; the government has already paid for the aircraft, 40 of which it received before the ban took effect.

SOMALIA

(See also *Intl.*, *UN*; *US*)

Aug. 12—As many as 42 casualties are reported in fighting in Mogadishu between forces loyal to General Mohammed Farah Aidid and to interim President Mohammed Ali Mahdi.

Aug. 27—US Defense Department officials and representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross say they have reached an agreement on the use of US aircraft and personnel in the relief effort in Somalia.

Aug. 28—Three guards are killed and 2 UN military observers wounded by gunmen in Mogadishu after refusing to halt their vehicle for the attackers.

The first 4 US military aircraft carrying relief supplies land in Belet Uen.

SOUTH AFRICA

Aug. 3—A 2-day general strike, termed by the African National Congress (ANC) a "referendum" on the end of white-majority rule, begins; the ANC says about 4 million of the country's 7 million formally employed blacks stayed home from work today; the Inkatha Freedom party and Pan-Africanist Congress oppose the strike.

Aug. 13—The government offers to declare a general unconditional amnesty for crimes committed during political unrest, applying both to civilians and to government officials and security personnel; the ANC insists that power first be surrendered to an interim government.

Aug. 27—Minister of Law and Order Hernus Kriel announces reforms of the South African police aimed at promoting more black officers and restoring public confidence in the force; he says one-third of the top command, which has been open to whites only, is being forced into retirement.

SRI LANKA

Aug. 8—Ten top military officials are killed by a landmine on Kayts Island; the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam claims responsibility.

Aug. 9—Twenty-two people are killed in a Tamil village in the eastern district of Batticaloa; the army denies involvement and the attack remains unexplained.

SYRIA

(See *Intl.*, *Middle East Peace Conference*; *Lebanon*)

THAILAND

Aug. 1—Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun dismisses Supreme Military Commander Kaset Rojananil and General Issarapong Noonpackdee, the army commander; pro-democracy groups had demanded that military leaders be put on trial for the killing of at least 52 civilians in demonstrations in Bangkok in May.

TURKEY

Aug. 24—Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel announces the country will renew attempts at suppressing the Marxist Kurdish Workers party, the guerrilla group the government

holds responsible for the last 2 days of unrest, which has left 31 people dead.

UNITED KINGDOM (UK)

(See also *Intl.*, *Yugoslav Crisis*; *Iraq*)

Northern Ireland

Aug. 10—Britain bans the Ulster Defense Association, the province's largest Protestant paramilitary organization, saying it engages in terrorism; Protestant assassins have been blamed for nearly half the 87 sectarian killings in Northern Ireland in 1991.

UNITED STATES (US)

(See also *Intl.*, *NAFTA*; *China*; *Iraq*; *Kuwait*; *Pakistan*; *Somalia*)

Aug. 3—The Senate votes, 68–26, for a 9-month moratorium on nuclear testing and for the elimination of all nuclear tests by 1996; the measure, which would take effect October 1, would allow over 3 years 15 tests of existing systems for safety and reliability.

Aug. 5—Deputy Secretary of State Lawrence Eagleburger requests a special session of the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva next week to investigate possible war crimes in the former Yugoslavia; this comes after 2 days of disclosures by administration officials of information regarding possible human rights violations in detention camps in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, and Serbia.

Aug. 11—In Kennebunkport, Maine, President George Bush and Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin announce their agreement on \$10 billion in US loan guarantees; Rabin's administration plans to use the funds to help settle the wave of Jews from the former Soviet Union who have come to Israel.

Aug. 14—White House spokesman Marlin Fitzwater announces the US will begin an emergency airlift of food to Somalia and Kenya; so far, the government has donated \$77-million worth of food to drought-stricken areas in both countries.


Aug. 19—At its national convention in Houston, the Republican party nominates Bush and Vice President Dan Quayle as the party's candidates for the 1992 presidential election.

Aug. 23—Secretary of State James Baker 3d leaves his post to become the White House chief of staff in charge of Bush's re-election campaign; Eagleburger becomes acting secretary of state.

Aug. 26—George Kenney, acting head of Yugoslav affairs for the US Foreign Service, resigns to protest what he calls US inaction in the Yugoslav crisis.

Aug. 28—The first of 6,000 army and marine troops arrive at Homestead air force base in Florida to begin efforts to aid the residents of southern Florida, many of whom were left without food or shelter when Hurricane Andrew struck on August 24; government officials estimate damage caused by the hurricane in Miami and other areas of Dade County at approximately \$30 billion. ■

Errata: In our September 1992 issue, a production error led to the deletion of a line in Jan Prybyla's article. The last sentence on page 262 should read: "One-third of the \$3.5-billion foreign investment in the Xiamen special economic zone (SEZ) in Fujian province comes from Taiwan." A similar error occurred in Thomas Gottschang's article. The end of the last sentence on page 268 should read: "Citibank became the first American bank to take advantage of the change in policy. This May the central bank announced that foreign banks would be allowed to open branches. . . ." We regret the errors.



COMING IN NOVEMBER IN CURRENT HISTORY: EUROPE

Our next issue looks at the "Europe without borders" that is to become a reality on January 1, 1993. We also focus on eastern Europe and examine the war in the former Yugoslavia—continental Europe's first since World War II. The division between the Czech lands and Slovakia, economic disarray in Poland, as well as what United States policy should be toward the former Communist countries are also reviewed. Topics scheduled to be covered include:

- **Europe Looks Beyond the Single Market**
BY GREGORY TREVERTON, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
- **Germany: Between East and West**
BY DAVID WALKER, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, STORRS
- **US Policy Toward Emerging European Democracies**
BY JENONNE WALKER, WOODROW WILSON CENTER FOR INTERNATIONAL SCHOLARS
- **Implementing the Market in East-Central Europe**
BY SHARON WOLCHIK, GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY
- **Yugoslavia: The Ethnic Test**
BY LENARD COHEN, SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
- **Czechoslovakia: The Political Test**
BY MILAN SVEC, US ARMY RUSSIAN INSTITUTE
- **Poland: The Economic Test**
BY JANE CURRY, SANTA CLARA UNIVERSITY
- **Hungary: The Example to Emulate?**
BY IVAN BEREND, UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, LOS ANGELES

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